The Crisis in Transatlantic Relations. ZEI Discussion Papers C. 143, 2005 by Wells, Samuel et al.
The Crisis in
Transatlantic Relations
Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung
Center for European Integration Studies
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn
Samuel Wells /
Ludger Kühnhardt (eds.)
C143
2005
D
i
s
c
u
s
s
i
o
n
P
a
p
e
r
Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung
Center for European Integration Studies
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn
Walter-Flex-Straße 3
D-53113 Bonn
Germany
Tel.:
Fax:
http:
+49-228-73-1880
+49-228-73-1788
//www.zei.de
ISSN 1435-3288 ISBN 3-936183-43-0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
About the Authors: 
 
Geert Ahrens is retired Ambassador and Senior Fellow at the Center for European 
Integration Studies, Bonn. 
 
Andreas Andrianopoulos is Member of Parliament, Athens. 
 
Anna Balletbò is President of the Olaf Palme Foundation, Badalona, and former Mem-
ber of Parliament. 
 
Shahram Chubin is Director of Research at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 
Geneva. 
 
Alex Danchev is working at the School of Politics, University of Nottingham. 
 
Haldun Gülalp is Professor of Sociology at Bogazici University, Istanbul. 
 
Pierre Hassner is Research Director Emeritus and Professor of International Relations 
at the Institute of Political Studies and the Center for International Studies and Re-
search, National Foundation for Political Sciences (Sciences-Po), Paris. 
 
Ludger Kühnhardt is Director at the Center for European Integration Studies, Bonn. 
 
Emil Pain is Director of the Center for Ethnopolitical Studies, Moscow. 
 
Elke Thiel was formerly Head of the Research Unit European Integration at the 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin. 
 
Robert Wade is Professor of Political Economy at the Development Studies Institute, 
London School of Economics, London. 
 
Samuel Wells is Associate Director at the Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, D.C. 
 
Michael Werz is Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund in Washington, 
D.C., and Associate Professor at the Institute for Sociology in Hannover. 
 Content 
 
 
Samuel Wells / Ludger Kühnhardt 
Introduction 
 
 
5
Alex Danchev 
How Strong Are Shared Values? 
 
 
11
Andreas Andrianopoulos 
USA – Europe: Do We Still Share Similar Values? 
 
 
21
Anna Balletbò 
Diverging Systems of Governance? 
 
 
27
Geert Ahrens 
Diverging Systems of Governance: Not a Convincing Explanation 
of Recent Developments 
 
 
33
Robert Wade 
US and European Relations with Developing Countries: Aid, 
Trade, and Investment 
 
 
43
Elke Thiel 
Prospects for Economic Cooperation: Trade and Monetary Policy 
 
 
57Emil Pain 
Neo-Traditionalism: a New Choice for Russia? 
 
 
67
Haldun Gülalp 
The Turkish Route to Democracy: Domestic Reform via Foreign 
Policy 
 
 
75
Michael Werz 
Back to the Future? 
Remarks on the Next Generation of Transatlantic Relations 
 
 
87
Pierre Hassner 
Beyond Iraq: The Transatlantic Crisis in Perspective 
 
 
95
Shahram Chubin 
Prospects for US-European Cooperation on Terrorism and 
Proliferation 
 
 
109
 
 Samuel Wells / Ludger Kühnhardt 
Introduction 
From September 9-11, 2004, 57 former fellows of the Woodrow Wilson 
International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C., and many of their 
spouses met at the Center for European Integration Studies, Bonn, to ana-
lyze and exchange views on the topic “The Crisis in Transatlantic Rela-
tions.” The general attitude of this group of intellectuals and policymakers 
does not differ from the results shown in the recently released Transatlantic 
Trends 2004 from The German Marshall Fund of the United States.  Most 
attendees are critical of U.S. policy in Iraq and of U.S. policies toward the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  Some felt that France, Germany, and the new 
Socialist government of Spain had gone too far in continuing to place ob-
stacles in the way of reconstruction aid to Iraq.  Almost all hoped that 
transatlantic relations would improve, and felt that this would be facilitated 
by a change of administration in Washington in this coming November’s 
election. 
The first session focused on the question “How Strong are Shared Values?” 
Alex Danchev of the University of Nottingham, United Kingdom, opened 
with a skeptical and provocative analysis emphasizing the differences be-
tween Europe and America.  He pointed out that there was a long tradition 
of high rhetoric about shared values and that this was in itself a key ele-
ment of holding the community together, but he argued that the two sides 
of the Atlantic held very different values on issues such as torture, death 
penalty, religion, role of the state, and the use of force in international af-
fairs.  He provided a sharp analysis of five areas of difference between 
Americans and Europeans with the qualifier that many in Great Britain 
were an exception to these European views.  His areas of difference in-
cluded the open invocation of religion in political life (“Europeans do not Samuel Wells / Ludger Kühnhardt 
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do God”), the role of highly positive thinking about the possibility of end-
less perfectibility in both human and economic affairs (“Europeans do not 
do self-belief”), the assumption that there was a global role for the United 
States (“Europeans do not do China”), the difference of the highly affirma-
tive and optimistic and open attitude of Americans (“Europeans do not do 
can do”), and finally the belief in the efficacy of the use of force (“Europe-
ans do not to war”).  Danchev closed by saying that many Europeans felt 
that the United States was no longer legitimate as a provider of world order 
although it might be welcomed as an investor.  But the United States “is 
neither loved nor trusted.”  Nevertheless the transatlantic relationship con-
tinues in large part on the memories of the past and the fact that “‘we have 
a lot in common’ is the mantra that holds us together.” 
Andreas Andrianopoulos, author and Member of Parliament in Greece, 
took a more positive attitude toward shared transatlantic values.  He 
pointed out that the U.S. refusal to use NATO in Afghanistan marked an 
end of the alliance as it had been known in the Cold War, and that the Bush 
administration had broken other ties on environment, the ABM treaty, civil 
liberties, and agricultural subsidies in the face of WTO rulings.  He ac-
knowledged that Europeans resent the great preponderance of U.S. military 
power and its successful economic growth and its huge economic reach.  
But he thought that the basis for future cooperation still existed and con-
tended that the United States in order to activate cooperation must show 
that it wants to work with the Europeans and will listen to their views. 
In a session on “Diverging Systems of Governance?,” neither speaker felt 
that Europe’s shared sovereignty and extensive engagement with interna-
tional treaties and regulatory regimes was an element in current transatlan-
tic disputes.  Anna Balletbò, a twenty-year Member of the Spanish Parlia-
ment from Barcelona, felt that the Europeans had essentially continued in a 
fairly steady dual policy of integrating their economies and societies while 
enlarging the scope of the European Union, and it was the United States 
that had begun to shift its form of government and the nature of its policies 
since the 1970s through increasing influence of neo-conservatives and their 
ties with the media and think tanks.  She insisted that the only way for 
transatlantic relations to improve would be to replace the Bush administra-Introduction 
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tion with a Democratic president.  Geert Ahrens, a recently retired German 
diplomat with extensive service in the developing world and in Southeast-
ern Europe, said that from his experience transatlantic relations began to 
deteriorate as early as 1991 when viewed from the perspective of the Bal-
kan crises.  He felt that the current transatlantic crisis which had become 
much more serious than in the early 1990s stems from a growing imbalance 
of military and economic power between the United States and Europe.  He 
did point out significant differences in European and American approaches 
to international governance in areas such as acceptance of international ju-
dicial institutions like the International Criminal Court, belief in the need 
for UN endorsement before moving to the use of force, and acceptance of 
international environmental agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol.  He 
called for better communication and increased cooperation between Europe 
and America which he believes is the foundation for improving interna-
tional relations more broadly. 
A session on “Prospects for Economic Cooperation” found agreement that 
there was a significant gap between the developing world of the European 
Union and the United States and the economic realities of the southern 
hemisphere.  Robert Wade of the London School of Economics pointed to 
the lack of cooperation between the United States and Europe on develop-
mental assistance and contended that, while there was cooperation on trade 
and investment rules, many of these rules had made it more difficult for the 
south to close the gap in development.  Elke Thiel, former head of the re-
search unit on European integration for the Stiftung Wissenchaft und 
Politik of Berlin, spoke about trade and monetary policy and contended that 
the top issue for officials on both sides of the Atlantic was the resolution of 
WTO trade disputes. 
Emil Pain, Director of the Center for Ethnopolitical Studies in Moscow, 
focused on Russian political and economic choices in a session on “The 
European Union’s Eastern Neighbors,” contending that in recent years 
Russia had made a large shift in values in a conservative and authoritarian 
direction.  He reported widespread approval of the centralization of power 
in the Kremlin and the fact that almost two-thirds of Russians recently sur-
veyed see ethnic minorities as the country’s main problem and believe in Samuel Wells / Ludger Kühnhardt 
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the slogan “Russia for Russians.” He called for continued contacts and ex-
changes with both the European Union and the United States in order to 
keep different policy choices open to politically engaged elites.  Haldun 
Gülalp of Bogazici University in Turkey discussed the evolution of democ-
ratic institutions under the Welfare and Reform Party, known in Turkey as 
the AK Party.  He pointed out that the AK Party had won a clear majority 
in elections of November 2002 on a platform of making those reforms nec-
essary to meet requirements for accession into the European Union.  He 
discussed how the AK Party showed that it could govern effectively and 
make reforms in political and societal institutions, and in doing so demon-
strated how the former secular ruling elite had used the fear of Islamic po-
litical parties to keep Muslims out of power and to prevent basic reforms.  
The AK Party has used the desire for EU membership to force through de-
mocratic reforms showing that a Muslim party can be both reformist and 
democratic.  This was the reason why success of the European Union 
summit in December of 2004 was so critical for the AKP. 
In a session on “Cultural Trends,” Michael Werz of the Institute of Sociol-
ogy at Hannover University in Germany argued that there was no gap in 
values between Germany and the United States but there had developed 
under pressures of 9/11 and Iraq a different approach to policy.  He showed 
how Germany had developed a very unusual society during the Cold War:  
it was the center of world politics but had no foreign policy, no national 
interests, and extremely close ties to the United States.  After the fall of the 
Berlin Wall in 1989, Germany had to develop a foreign policy, a national 
style and values, all while absorbing a large contingent of very different 
citizens from East Germany.  Under the pressure of the war against terror-
ism and the war against Iraq, Germany had to make many decisions on its 
own and relied upon its strong aversion to war and a strong commitment to 
protect civil liberties to make different policy choices from those made in 
Washington. 
In a concluding session on “Security Challenges,” Pierre Hassner of the 
Center for International Studies and Research in Paris pointed out that 
many international challenges are underway in the field of international 
security, but that the Iraq war and aspects of the war against terrorism have Introduction 
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created a major crisis between European governments and the United 
States.  He pointed out that only in the United States did a majority of the 
population agree on a case for war against Iraq, but as the problems with 
establishing security after the major fighting developed, roughly fifty per-
cent of Americans now question the wisdom of that war.  He feels that the 
lessons of Iraq include the fact that spreading democracy in the Middle 
East is very difficult and cannot be done by force; that war has increased 
the terrorist threat and increased the prospects for a clash of civilizations; 
that the war has advanced nuclear programs and the danger of proliferation 
in both Iran and North Korea; and, that the U.S. demonstrable desire for 
global hegemony may be limited by the experience in Iraq.  Shahram 
Chubin, Director of Research at the Geneva Center for Security Policy in 
Switzerland, talked about cooperation on issues of terrorism and nonprolif-
eration.  He pointed out that there had been recognition of the same threats 
in Europe and America with the spread of weapons of mass destruction and 
terrorism being at the top of the list.  He argued that the war against terror-
ism as characterized in U.S. policy will be a very long struggle and it will 
be hard to measure success or even know if the war can be won.  He 
pointed out that Europeans do not see the battle against terrorism as a 
“war” but see many separate terrorist cells with a web of cooperation exist-
ing among them. He asserted that Europeans completely reject the notion 
that Iraq is part of a struggle against terrorism.  Chubin pointed out that co-
operation on issues of nonproliferation is better than it was ten years ago, 
but that difficulties still occur on what action is to be taken on its degree of 
urgency and on sharing intelligence.  He foresees future disputes over re-
sponsibility for Iraq, action to be taken if another terrorist attack occurs in 
the United States, what policies to pursue on the nuclear programs in Iran 
and North Korea, and on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  
The contributions to the joint conference of the Center for European Inte-
gration Studies and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars 
in conjuncture with the Woodrow Wilson European Alumni Association 
are now assembled in this Discussion Paper. Alex Danchev 
How Strong Are Shared Values? 
The pitch for shared values is long on assertion and strong on tradition, al-
most as if ritual incantation will make it come true, like prayers, or at least 
provide some comfort for the bereft. Perhaps it is also a pitch for that elu-
sive spot so coveted by statespersons of every persuasion, the moral high 
ground. ‘We are the ally of the US not because they are powerful, but be-
cause we share their values,’ Tony Blair admonished a gathering of British 
ambassadors in January 2003. ‘I am not surprised by anti-Americanism,’ he 
continued snappishly, making a familiar move, ‘but it is a foolish indul-
gence. For all their faults, and all nations have them, the US are a force for 
good; they have liberal and democratic traditions of which any nation can 
be proud.’
1 
So fervent and so insistent is this evangelist tendency, that the rhetoric of 
shared values is itself part and parcel of the trappings of transatlanticism. 
The mobilizing notion of an Atlantic community – a community of values 
– is among other things an exploitation of history for present purposes, de-
ployed by one side or another as circumstances dictate. Appeals to an At-
lantic future are all in some measure exhortations to live up to an Atlantic 
past. The future is wish-fulfilled. The past is monumentalized, as Nietzsche 
says. ‘As long as the soul of historiography lies in the great stimuli that a 
man of power derives from it, as long as the past has to be described as 
worthy of imitation, as imitable and possible for a second time, it of course 
incurs the danger of becoming somewhat distorted, beautified and coming 
close to free poetic invention; there have been ages, indeed, which were 
quite incapable of distinguishing between a monumentalized past and a 
 
1   Prime Minister’s address to British ambassadors in London, 7 January 2003. Alex Danchev 
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mythical fiction, because precisely the same stimuli can be derived from 
the one world as from the other.’
2 Public performance – celebration – has 
always been an important element in the transatlantic relationship, espe-
cially among its poets and propagandists, from Irving to Isaiah Berlin, who 
in this respect whistled very much the same tune, making it peculiarly ap-
propriate that Winston Churchill, the Evangelist-in-Chief of the English 
Speaking Peoples, should get them mixed up. 
My British buddy, 
We’re as diff’rent as can be; 
He thinks he’s winning the war, 
And I think it’s me. 
But we’re in there pitching, 
And on one thing we agree: 
When the job is done 
And the war is won, 
We’ll be clasping hands across the sea.
3 
The evangelist tendency has always been suspect. It was expertly satirized 
over fifty years ago by the author of One-Upmanship, Stephen Potter, who 
included a helpful section on what he called Hands-Across-The-
Seamanship, ‘this splendid instrument of general dis-ease, gambits, 
counter-gambits, and the one-up-one-down atmosphere.’ Hands-Across-
The-Seamanship was at the same time subtle and not so subtle: 
It is not our policy continuously to try to be one-up, as a nation, on other 
nations; but it is our aim to rub in the fact that we are not trying to do this, 
otherwise what is the point of not trying to do this? 
 
2   Friedrich Nietszche, trans R. J. Hollingdale, ‘On the uses and disadvantages of his-
tory  for life’ [1874], in Untimely Meditations (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1983), p. 70 (emphasis in original). 
3   Irving Berlin, from ‘My British Buddy’, written for the British version of This is the 
Army (1943). Cf. Isaiah Berlin, ‘Things which Americans hold against the British’ 
(1942), among them: ‘Superior airs of British persons in America and their unspo-
ken attitude that theirs is the right way of doing things, by the mere fact that they do 
it that way. Their “when in Rome, do as the English do” attitude.’ Both documents 
are printed in Isaiah Berlin, Flourishing: Letters 1928-1946 (London: Chatto & 
Windus, 2004), pp. 397 and 401. Isaiah’s version of Churchill and the tale of two 
Berlins is told on pp. 478-80. How Strong Are Shared Values? 
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First lessons concentrate on the necessity of always using the same phrases, 
and using them again and again. No harm in the general reader memorizing 
one or two of them now: 
We have a lot in common. 
After all, we come from the same stock. 
We have a lot to learn from each other.
4 
Potter was echoing the founding fathers. The preamble to the North Atlan-
tic Treaty (1949) affirms the determination of the signatories ‘to safeguard 
the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on 
the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law’. No one 
now consults the North Atlantic Treaty – in truth, no one now consults 
NATO – but this sort of talk is indeed the common currency of a certain 
kind of celebration. It celebrates a vividly imagined community of like-
minded peoples, kith and kin across the storm-tossed sea, locked in tight 
embrace for noble if cloudy purpose. The President himself (or his speech-
writers) indulged in it only last year on a state visit to Britain, when he ex-
tolled the virtues of something ‘more than an alliance of security and com-
merce, … an alliance of values’: 
The fellowship of generations is the cause of common beliefs. We believe in 
open societies ordered by moral conviction. We believe in private markets, 
humanized by compassionate government. We believe in economies that re-
ward effort, communities that protect the weak, and the duty of nations to re-
spect the dignity and the rights of all. And whether one learns these ideals in 
County Durham or in West Texas, they instil mutual respect and they inspire 
common purpose.… 
The deepest beliefs of our nations set the direction of our foreign policy. We 
value our own civil rights, so we stand for the human rights of others. We af-
firm the God-given dignity of every person, so we are moved to action by pov-
erty and oppression and famine and disease. The United States and Great Brit-
ain share a mission in a world beyond the balance of power or the simple pur-
suit of interest. We seek the advance of freedom and the peace that freedom 
 
4   Stephen Potter, ‘Hands-Across-The-Seamanship’ in One Upmanship (1952), re-
printed in The Complete Upmanship (London: Hart-Davis, 1970), p. 263. The stock 
phrases bear an uncanny resemblance to those used in MORI public opinion polling 
to this day. For the Evangelical and other tendencies in Anglo-American context see 
Alex Danchev, On Specialness (London: Macmillan, 1998), ch. 1. Alex Danchev 
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brings. Together our nations are standing and sacrificing for this high goal in a 
distant land at this very hour.
5 
Many found this hard to swallow at the time. In retrospect, the issue of the 
hollowness of the rhetoric is unavoidable, given what is now known of the 
degrading practices at Abu Ghraib and other facilities around the globe. 
The God-given dignity of every person in American custody has not been 
respected, to put it mildly. The damage is uncontained and perhaps uncon-
tainable. Its poisonous effect will surely be long-lasting, especially in the 
Muslim world – a disastrous outcome. Moral capital is an asset of immeas-
urable worth and distinctive properties. It evaporates before your very eyes, 
but it takes the wisdom of ages to accrue. 
For an alliance of values, moral ruination is a particular hardship. Such an 
observation is not anti-Americanism. (Argumentative space is also part of 
the transatlantic tradition.) Nor is it a gambit, in Stephen Potter’s terms, a 
smuggled claim to be one-up. There is no scope for self-exculpation. Re-
grettably, Britain appears to have been complicit in the system of abuse 
from the outset. Virtually every member of the European comity of nations 
has fallen into similar temptation in the recent past. Europe, not Africa, is 
‘the dark continent’ of the twentieth century, as Mark Mazower has power-
fully demonstrated.
6 International (or transatlantic) point-scoring is fruit-
less. The damage is indivisible. 
Whoever degrades another degrades me, 
And whatever is done or said returns at last to me.
7 
The harder question is how far a global war on terror is compatible with 
life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, at home and abroad, and to what 
extent the inevitable contradictions will expose and exacerbate transatlantic 
tensions in an era when Europe has lost salience for many Americans and 
America has lost credence for many Europeans – when the very idea of an 
alliance of values seems either quaint or oppressive. A recent Pew Center 
 
5   Remarks by President George W. Bush at Whitehall Palace, London, 19 November 
2003. 
6   Mark Mazower, Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century (London: Penguin, 
1998). 
7   Walt Whitman, from ‘Song of Myself’, in Leaves of Grass (Oxford: World’s Clas-
sics, 1998), p. 48. How Strong Are Shared Values? 
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poll finds that 43% of all Americans, 48% of American men, 54% of 
American men under fifty, and 58% of people intending to vote for George 
W. Bush in November believe torture of suspected terrorists can ‘often’ or 
‘sometimes’ be justified.
8 There seems to be no directly comparable data 
for Europeans. Any guesswork in this field is fraught with difficulty – there 
has been altogether too much self-congratulation in the matter of European 
civilization – but it would be surprising if the percentages were as high, in 
either old or new Europe, to borrow Donald Rumsfeld’s false dichotomy. It 
would also be interesting to map these beliefs on to other beliefs, such as 
capital punishment, including the execution of juveniles and the mentally 
retarded;
9 or redistributive justice; or religious observance. ‘Life is mean-
ingful only because God exists’, according to 61% of Americans, 37% of 
Spaniards, 36% of Britons, and 29% of the French.
10 
Those figures capture the typical variance between European and American 
expressions of moral preferences and cultural predispositions. Europeans 
and Americans make different selections from the menu of collective 
choices on offer, in the forum as in the delicatessen. Moreover the menu 
itself is not the same. It is easy enough to identify generalized transatlantic 
commonalities of a liberal-democratic kind – the rule of law, equal rights, 
freedom of speech, religious toleration, equality of opportunity, mother-
hood, apple pie – but the effort to give them greater operational precision is 
a lesson in cultural difference. The pursuit of happiness is an essentially 
contested concept. In this sense New Amsterdam and Old Amsterdam are 
as far apart as Paris, Texas and Paris, France. They may recognize the same 
precepts, politically, economically and socially, but their interpretation of 
 
8   Pew Research Center, July 2004 Foreign Policy and Party Images Survey. The ques-
tion was: ‘Do you think the use of torture against suspected terrorists in order to 
gain important information can often be justified, sometimes be justified, rarely be 
justified, or never be justified?’ 32% said ‘never’. 
9   The US Supreme Court is about to consider whether it is constitutional to execute 
people for crimes committed when they were sixteen or seventeen years old. 
10 World Values Survey (1990-93), in Ronald Inglehart et al., Human Values and Be-
liefs (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998). The French, it appears, have 
been underestimated. Not only are they cheese-eating surrender monkeys – so la-
belled by that omniscient commentator on international affairs, Bart Simpson – they 
are Godless cheese-eating surrender monkeys. Alex Danchev 
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liberty, equality and fraternity is radically divergent. In other words there 
are striking differences in transatlantic core values clustered around the na-
ture of the social contract and the scope of the public realm. Put crudely, 
the United States is on the side of the individual; self-help and self-interest 
are elevated to the status of ethical principle. In Robert Putnam’s resonant 
metaphor, Americans are bowling alone.
11 
Needless to say, any attempt to draw distinctions like covering laws be-
tween two patchwork quilt continents is asking for trouble. As Immanuel 
Wallerstein has acutely observed, ‘there is of course no single American 
tradition or single set of values. There are, and always have been, many 
Americas. We each of us remember and appeal to the Americas we pre-
fer.’
12 The same goes for Europe, even more so, given its history and its 
current status as a work in progress. Nevertheless, it seems to me that dis-
tinctions can be drawn, and that this is an invitation to draw them. I offer a 
small selection or provocation, in summary form, starting at the top. 
In contradistinction to Americans, 
Europeans do not do God.
13 See above, and George W. Bush, passim. 
(‘Freedom is not America’s gift to the world. Freedom is the Almighty 
God’s gift to every man and woman in this world.’) ‘I knew that my God 
was bigger than his. I knew that my God was a real God and his was an 
idol,’ the US Deputy Under-Secretary of Defense for Intelligence told an 
evangelical meeting in the run-up to the Iraq War.
14 It is almost inconceiv-
able that any European in public office would express himself in such a 
 
11 Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Commu-
nity (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000). See also Michael Sandel, Democracy’s 
Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy (New Haven: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1996). 
12 Immanuel Wallerstein, ‘America and the world: the twin towers as metaphor’ 
(2001), p. 14, at www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/wallerstein_text_only.htm (accessed 
23 August 2004). 
13 In a celebrated footnote at the beginning of The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 
1848-1918 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1954), the impish A. J. P. Taylor wrote: ‘It be-
comes wearisome to add “except the Italians” to every generalization. Henceforth it 
may be assumed’ (p. xxiii). The same applies here to the British, or at any rate to 
the missionary Mr Blair. 
14 Sidney Blumenthal, ‘The religious warrior of Abu Ghraib’, Guardian, 20 May 2004. How Strong Are Shared Values? 
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fashion (in the eighteenth century, perhaps, but not in the twenty-first). 
There is a view that the difference lies precisely in the mode of expression, 
or the culture of public discourse, rather than the prevalence of fundamen-
talist belief. ‘This is religion American-style,’ as Susan Sontag puts it: 
‘namely, more the idea of religion than religion itself.’
15 However that may 
be, faith-based full spectrum dominance is unlikely to reassure a Europe 
teeming with parsimonious secular rationalists. 
Europeans do not do self-belief. Americans believe in the perfectibility of 
man, or at least of Americans. In this domain as in others, Europeans have 
lost their faith. At the risk of prolonging the life of threadbare stereotypes 
(innocence and experience, naïveté and ennui), an instinctive possibilism is 
one of the great American virtues. An instinctive impossibilism may be go-
ing too far, but the contrasting ascription of weariness or wariness to Euro-
peans is now deeply embedded in the collective psyche. Whether it be cir-
cumspection, amelioration, or exhaustion, Europe looks askance at the ‘can 
do’ culture. Europeans do not do can do. 
Europeans do not do China. China will serve as a kind of metonym for the 
world. Proverbially, Americans think big; Washington has world-historical 
ambitions, as J. M. Coetzee has remarked, not without a certain frisson.
16 
No one could accuse Brussels of world-historical ambitions. Not even Ber-
lin has them now, except perhaps in architectural construction. European 
horizons have shrunk. Something very like parochialism has set in. There 
was always a difference of conception (having to do, possibly, with self-
belief). Historically, Europeans lost empires with monotonous regularity, 
but they did not think or speak in terms of ‘losing’ China, in the way that 
Americans often lamented that they had lost China, at around the same time 
as they found NATO. Plus ça change … While the Americans devote a 
 
15 Susan Sontag, ‘The fragile alliance’, Guardian, 18 October 2003. 
16 ‘I deplore the world and what it’s coming to,’ says Coetzee’s character Elizabeth 
Costello, in a story he read to an audience at the New York Public Library last year. 
‘[History] has been taken prisoner by a gang of thugs who torture her and make her 
say things she does not mean.’ Guardian, 27 November 2003. Alex Danchev 
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prodigious amount of energy to the huge challenge of how that behemoth 
might be regained, China barely registers on the European radar.
17  
Europeans do not do verbalization. Europeans constantly marvel at Ameri-
can lack of inhibition, verbally speaking, and at the amazing openness and 
unselfconscious affirmativeness that goes with it. In the New York subway 
there is a sign saying, ‘Please, no running in the station. (Though we ap-
plaud your boundless energy and zest for living.)’ Sometimes the verbal 
can be gestural. Outside the off-Broadway production of ‘Guantánamo’ 
there are pink party bags, courtesy of Women Centre Stage, with lipstick, 
mascara and wrinkle remover for those whose frowns at US and British 
foreign policy has left permanent scars. Naturally, Europeans pride them-
selves on their verbal fluency, not to mention their cultural superiority; and, 
of course, they have been known to orate. But that is not the same. It has 
been said of Henry James, the master navigator of the transatlantic terrain, 
‘at heart he was fascinated by Europeans, and yet he always suspected them 
of possessing some secret that was out of his reach because they would 
never express it clearly.’
18 
Europeans do not do war. The German Foreign Minister said exactly this 
during the build-up to the Iraq War. The French Foreign Minister began his 
oration to the UN Security Council on 14 February 2003, an oration that 
drew an unaccustomed round of applause from that restrained body, with 
the impeccable sentiment that war is always a defeat. And of course there is 
Robert Kagan’s tract for the times, with its eye-catching proposition that 
‘Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus’.
19 Kagan can be 
irritating – the crude pitting of Kant against Hobbes as if in a heavyweight 
boxing match (Kant ahead on points, Hobbes cruising for a bruising) – but 
 
17 If only by way of illustrating the exception, I cannot refrain from mentioning that the 
University of Nottingham is currently developing a purpose-built campus in the city 
of Ningbo, on China’s eastern coast, some four hours’ drive from Shanghai – the 
first by a British university. 
18 Christophe Campos, in Henry James, The Ambassadors [1903] (Oxford: World’s 
Classics, 1998), p. 446. 
19 Robert Kagan, Paradise & Power (London: Atlantic, 2003), p. 3. And his after-
thoughts, ‘America’s crisis of legitimacy’, Foreign Affairs 83 (March-April 2004), 
pp. 65-87. How Strong Are Shared Values? 
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he cuts to the quick. Europeans and Americans ‘agree on little and under-
stand one another less and less’. This is not a passing phase. It is deep-
seated. ‘It is not just that Europeans and Americans have not shared the 
same view of what to do about a specific problem such as Iraq. They do not 
share the same broad view of how the world should be governed, about the 
role of international institutions and international law, about the proper bal-
ance between the use of force and the use of diplomacy in international af-
fairs.’
20 In other words, ‘they clash not only over tactics but over Weltan-
schauung’, as Josef Joffe pointed out some time ago.
21 
The alliance of values is overblown and oversold. To paraphrase Dean 
Acheson, the Atlantic has lost a community and not yet found a role. An 
Atlantic Alliance on the Cold War model has dissipated. It is not possible 
for a second time. Europeans and Americans are friends; they are no longer 
blood brothers. In 1945 each was indispensable to the other. There was an 
elemental apprehension of this, in the respective elites, and in the general 
populations. Sixty years on, demonstrable indispensability no longer ob-
tains. The felt need for it has been abrogated. The savour of it has been 
dulled. The visceral connection felt by so many of the old breed – the chill 
threat, the common destiny – all that has gone. For many Americans, 
Europe is not what it was. It has fattened and blurred. It is no longer in the 
eye of the storm. It may never be again. The German question, the central 
question of the Cold War, has been answered, definitively. For many Euro-
peans, America no longer burns so brightly as a beacon of hope. (Hope it-
self finds different expression across the pond.)
22 The United States has lost 
legitimacy as a pacifier. It is tolerated, in some quarters, as an enforcer. It is 
welcomed, cordially and sometimes avariciously, as an investor. It is nei-
ther loved nor trusted. 
 
20 Paradise & Power, pp. 3 and 37. 
21 Josef Joffe, ‘European-American relations: the enduring crisis’, Foreign Affairs 59 
(Spring 1981), p. 842. 
22 One of the most revealing gaps between Americans and Europeans concerns the 
question of whether people who move to the US from other countries have a better 
life. Americans overwhelmingly (88%) believe this to be the case. Europeans are 
less and less convinced (53% of Russians, 41% of Britons, 24% of French, 14% of 
Germans in 2004). Pew Research Center, A Year After Iraq War. Alex Danchev 
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This is not the end of the affair. The transatlantic relationship continues to 
roll along. It has formidable strengths, some of them well hidden. One of 
the greatest is the stories it tells to sustain itself. The real strength of shared 
values is in the soul of historiography. The truth lies somewhere between 
monumentalized past and mythical fiction. ‘We have a lot in common’ is 
the mantra that holds us together.  
 
 Andreas Andrianopoulos 
USA-Europe: Do We Still Share Similar 
Values? 
“We very seldom care about the election results in the US. This time how-
ever we care. We want George Bush to lose”, thus commented a columnist 
of the largest Greek daily newspaper “Ta Nea.” It appears that this is the 
case among the vast majority of Western Europeans. They very rarely 
really bothered about political developments in the USA. They considered 
the occupant of the Oval Office a political leader with little room for ma-
neuver. They expected normally a similar set of policies to be coming out 
of successive American administrations. But not this time. It appears that 
the Bush administration has violently rocked the boat. At least, as far as the 
old Europeans are concerned.  
I would like to explore here, in a few words, the concept of  “Old Europe.” 
It is fair to  say that it was not the Americans who initiated the distinction. 
The French President Jacques Chirac was the first to differentiate among 
the two parts of Europe. By implying that the, still prospective at that time, 
new members of the European Union should had kept their mouths shut on 
the issue of the war on Iraq, he made it clear, sometime in early 2003, that 
there were two sides in contemporary Europe. The countries that comprised 
the old “West,” and the new democracies that emerged from the collapse of 
communism. The latter, in the French President’s view, had no right to talk 
about transatlantic relations. Because, presumably, they could not under-
stand them. Similarly, the arrogant governing elite of western continental 
Europe appeared unable to comprehend the insecurities and feelings of 
helplessness that permeated the psyche of eastern Europeans. The EU will 
presumably attempt to mold a common set of values and understandings Andreas Andrianopoulos 
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among both parts of Europe. And, obviously, the old West hopes to attract 
the old East to its way of thinking.  
What is, therefore, the essence of this thinking? What was the basis of these 
transatlantic relations that formulated what for decades enabled us to talk 
about “the West?” The spectre of militaristic totalitarianism that dominated 
the world political scene during the first decades that followed the end of 
the second world war enabled the liberal democracies of western Europe 
and the Americas to come together and set up a common front of modera-
tion and respect for human rights. The economic and military strength of 
the United States constituted the pillar of this front. The Marshall Plan es-
tablished the prerogatives for Western Europe’s rapid growth. While 
American military might provided the necessary shield for  the unburdened 
preoccupation of European democracies with modernization, institution– 
building and the introduction of generous systems of social welfare. 
Within this context of American-European relations it was obvious that the 
Europeans were by far the principal beneficiaries. Faced with the threat of a 
possible westward soviet expansion – built upon a powerful ideological 
propaganda machine – the USA spent millions of dollars in Europe on so-
cial, educational and economic growth programs. At the same time, Wash-
ington established a network of political and/or military alliances around 
the globe – and with Europe in particular – to formulate policies  that facili-
tated the encapsulation of the soviets within their own political environ-
ment. During the years of the Cold War east vs. west military entangle-
ments were always peripheral. There was never in those days a conflict that 
involved a direct clash between the military forces of the two great adver-
saries.  
This situation facilitated by necessity a political environment of coopera-
tion and consultation. Although there were many internal antagonisms and 
elbow pushing among the otherwise close allies, officially the West pre-
sented a solid and unbreakable front.  Faith in liberal democracy, respect 
for human rights and adherence to the principles of a moderately regulated 
market economy characterized the shared values of the western political 
powers. Likewise,  the Americans, even in pure military matters, conferred USA-Europe: Do We Still Share Similar Values? 
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always with their NATO partners no matter how weak in that particular 
field they were.   
Some of these arrangements became shaky some years before the collapse 
of communism. Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher broke the consen-
sus of an interventionist in the economy state. And they challenged the rest 
of the West with the ultimate economic success of their new policies. Free 
market became the new political creed. And with the dismantling of com-
munism was established as the new orthodoxy. The overall arrangements 
however that had hitherto kept together the western alliance fell almost to-
tally apart after the Islamic terrorist attacks of  the 11
th of  September. With 
the war in Afghanistan the US realized that its NATO allies were more of a 
burden that a facilitator at moments of crisis and necessary swift military 
action. Dealing with the conflicting interests of the various European pow-
ers, when its national interests were perceived to be at risk, America ap-
peared to have decided that it did not have to bother. 
The full realization of this started hitting the Europeans gradually. At the 
beginning there were some American unilateral initiatives. First was the 
decision to revoke the Kyoto Treaty on the environment. Then came the 
American administration’s willingness to set up import barriers for a num-
ber of primarily European industrial products and to increase farm subsi-
dies ignoring the postulations of the WTO. Consultations among partners 
and allies appeared to be no longer desirable for Washington. The ideologi-
cal context of the post-war western milieu many felt that it was no longer 
there. Free market principles – that Europe worked very hard to finally 
adopt – were blatantly ignored. International treaties were revoked without 
prior discussions. And then came Washington’s bellicose attitude in world 
affairs. War against countries in any part of the world  could be declared 
with no regard for the interests or mutual arrangements of America’s hith-
erto western allies  Civil rights could be readily violated even unilaterally 
by the US in the name of security and anti-terrorist protection endeavours. 
The matrix of common values on which the decades old post-war transat-
lantic partnership had been built, has started to become torn apart. And of 
course everything started, or so was perceived by the Europeans, after a 
group of southern religious Republicans occupied the White House.  Andreas Andrianopoulos 
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Is this finally the end of the West? I sincerely believe that it is not. The 
events that unfolded after the tragic attacks of three years ago in New York 
and Washington brought into the surface tensions that were building up 
underground for years. Europe felt squeezed by America’s economic might 
and its own inability to fold back the generous systems of social welfare 
that its countries can no longer support financially. Europe failed to be-
come the new superpower that some of its members optimistically envis-
aged. Economic burdens, the sudden awareness that global power status 
entails huge military spending that very few Europeans appear willing to 
foot and an emerging  self-realization of the minimal world political stand-
ing for the EU as a whole influences many Europeans to turn against Amer-
ica. It is quite relieving psychologically to condemn someone whom you 
would have loved to replace. And Washington does nothing to ease these 
feelings. But Europeans still realize that without the USA’s military might 
and the stabilizing effect that its huge economy indirectly imposes upon the 
rest of the world there won’t be an environment for wealth creating, for 
peace to prevail and for real democracy to function.   
The Bush Administration’s handling of various international issues has in-
tensified tensions with the Europeans. Especially, with the war in Iraq. It 
appears that Washington not only  marginalized most of its allies by ignor-
ing their reservations but she also embarrassed its adamant supporters by 
founding the whole operation on a false pretext (the existence of Weapons 
of Mass Destruction). European leaders found excuses after the Iraq imbro-
glio to discover and project  differences with Washington on a number of 
fronts. The issue of Palestine is one of them. Developments in Western Su-
dan is another. Some key politicians, on the opposite shores of the Atlantic, 
are drifting dangerously apart. 
It is imperative that American leaders make some political amends. By in-
dicating that they respect European opinion and that they want to work 
closely with the continent’s leaders. The values we mentioned above have 
not disappeared. They are still there. But they are by and large ignored.  
The problem for Europe is not in my opinion the growth of a feeling of 
anti-Americanism. But exactly the opposite. The appearance, in other 
words,  in the US - for the first time ever since its War of Independence - of USA-Europe: Do We Still Share Similar Values? 
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an anti-European popular mood. One must consider the fact that the present 
day United States  includes huge numbers of people without any European 
ascendancy (Africans, Latin Americans, Asians). With whatever this may 
entail for the future.  
It is exactly for some of these reasons that serious politicians and moderate 
opinion makers in Europe care about the outcome of the forthcoming 
American election. Because the USA, as the most powerful partner, must 
take the initiative. A new climate of cooperation must emanate from the 
White House. Not necessarily by means of a new Administration. President 
Bush could himself take the initiative. He ought to change however sub-
stantially his stance vis–a–vis Europe. Ignore some of the unfounded 
claims of his neo-conservative advisors and political associates. Make ob-
vious that he dislikes the notion of an American Empire. The USA is very 
powerful. But it needs Europe to legitimize its actions and initiatives and to 
prove to the world that power hasn’t blinded her. America controls the eco-
nomic and military commanding heights of the world today. But Europe 
still holds the upper moral ground. And this is something that America 
needs. For all these changes to take place substantial and serious efforts are 
warranted. For many Europeans a change in the Washington political scene 
could make the beginning of a new relationship easier. They presume that it 
would have an important and devastating symbolic impact. This is why 
many hopefully foresee a Democratic victory, for which I personally have 
many reservations.    Anna Balletbò 
Diverging Systems of Governance? 
For the first time in history, many European citizens are confused about 
their feelings towards the United States of America. They ask themselves 
how to keep being friends with a country that traditionally symbolizes, lib-
erty and democracy, and that have admired so much, when the president of 
this country treats some important European countries as if they were ene-
mies. That’s what the American administration has done recently with 
Germany and France, among others, because of their denial to follow the 
unilateral interests of the Bush administration within the discussion about 
the invasion of Iraq with no other reason, than the so called “preventive 
war” although, as time goes by, it rather seems a “preventive business.” 
We all know, that in the United Nations system, each country has a vote, 
but we also know that not all the votes mean the same thing. Besides that 
the 5 permanent members of the Security Council have the right of veto, 
within the European Union organization the positions defended by Ger-
many and France have different consequences that the ones, for example, 
defended by Holland, Belgium, Slovenia or Slovakia. 
Javier Solana, in the present “Mr. Pesc,” and the politician with most 
knowledge about United States and Europe, its needs and differences, de-
fended last May in Paris in the Association “Mouvement Européen France” 
the great need to reinforce the “transatlantic relations.” From his point of 
view, Europe is the only global partner the United States has got. And the 
other way round. I agree with him.  No international conflict can nowadays 
be solved without the participation of both. We have a wide experience in 
the Balkans and more recently in Iraq. The transatlantic link has no substi-
tution.  Anna Balletbò 
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In order to solve the present situation of cool relations we should analyse a 
whole range of paradoxes that make us find each other very different when 
maybe we aren’t so much. The title of these speech “Diverging System of 
Governance?” could be somehow confusing if there wasn’t the interroga-
tion sign that follows it.  
The First Paradox 
First of all, we should not mistake the differences between systems of gov-
ernment, which may exist, and in some cases they do, with what is happen-
ing with the regression of the political progressive options, which have 
been set aside due to the ultra right crusade that was against the progress 
reached by the American people in the 60 and the deep transformation of 
the everyday life that went along with it. On one side Reagan, Bush father 
and, especially, Bush’s son, and on the other side, that is, on this shore of 
the Atlantic, Mrs. Thatcher and other fellows consolidated the conservative 
revolution and transformed it into political integrism, that is, into a ideo-
logical and political radical structure that was situated out of the main-
stream democratic consensus. 
This ideological radicalisation has had as consequence a movement in the 
right political forces that have brought the traditional right to the extreme  
right. So the centre took the place of the traditional right and the left be-
came the centre, bringing to confusion all the positions of the political 
spectrum.  
It is true that this has happened in absence of theoretical hypothesis and 
real proposals able to substitute the market democracy for the democracy of 
the citizens.  
The reduction of the political and ideological spectrum we referred to be-
fore and the hypermediatization of our societies confined the democratic 
participation to the exclusive space of the teledemocracy, where the omni-
presence of the image, the extreme simplification of the message and the 
obsessive protection of the collective identity in front of feared risks such 
as communism, immigration, the enemies called “axe of the evil”, terror-
ism, etc.,  have brought populism as a model in the political system. There 
are relevant coincidences between the Bush’s identiary autoritarism and the Diverging Systems of Governance? 
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European autocratic-national populisms emerging in Europe that has had 
several electoral successes. In Austria, the FPÖ in 1999 got the 26,9% of 
the votes; in Switzerland Schweizer Volkspartei got in 2003 almost 27% of 
the votes; in Belgium the (VB) Vlaams Blok has become a big political 
party and got more than 24% of the votes in the city of Amberes; in Nor-
way the Fremskrittspartiet has become the second party. But among them, 
“Forza Italia” is, without any doubt, the most worrying phenomenon be-
cause works as model for a new radical populist right that offers the “tele-
cratic” promise of security and hope in front of the ghost of the everyday 
life of fear and failure.  
We cannot forget Spain, where the practices of informative manipulation 
and lies to the citizens about the disaster of March 11
th took unexpectedly 
out of government the party of José María Aznar, the unconditional friend 
of the oil-lobby that rules the world from the White House. 
But we also cannot forget different Russian populisms; Putin, Jirinovski, 
the Ròdina Blok of Dimitri Rogocine; the Radical Party of Serbia, the first 
party in the country despite its leader, Vojislv Seselj, is now in prison; nei-
ther the Big Rumania Party, the second in the country. All these examples 
show the existence of a new phenomenon, the new Euroatlantic Alliance of 
national-populist condition that can be decisive in the implosion of  democ-
racy in the world. 
Second Paradox 
The ideological hegemony of the integrist-conservatism is nowadays what 
presides the political destiny of the United States and the international 
right. It has taken almost 30 years to consolidate without its opponents even 
realising. With good will they still call it neoliberalism, (so European con-
ception). Although it is true that the economic conception of neoliberalism 
bases on the absolute primacy of the market and the goods, the systematic 
privatisation of companies and services, the extreme deregularization of all 
economic sectors even with high social costs, what is happening in the 
United States actually is the contrary of what may seem. The principles 
mentioned before are only partially followed by Bush’s government whose 
most clear expression is represented by the “Neocoms.” Anna Balletbò 
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There’s nothing more far away from the neoliberal principals orbit that the 
insistent intervention of Bush’s administration in the American economic 
life; its continuous resistance to control the monopolies; the permanent use 
of the public budget to stimulate the economy the direct adjudication of 
contracts and credits to the great multinational friends, with which they 
have links, in a systematic exercise of “cronycapitalism.” Bush with Car-
lyle; Richard Perle with Bechtel; Dick Cheney with Halliburton; Carl Rove 
with Boeing; Douglas Faith and Paul Wolfowitz with Northrop; Richard 
Armiatge with Raytheon, producer of the Tomahawks missiles, etc... It 
could appear that the last war has been the ideal excuse for them to make 
good business.  
It is difficult to consider liberal or neoliberal a political project in which the 
leaders and the power structure, the so called MICE, military, industrial, 
economic and parliamentarian, build an Establishment whose objective is 
to impose a unique ideology and a global rule led by a group that does it in 
its own benefit. 
Third Paradox 
In addition, this Establishment has been penetrated by the Christian funda-
mentalism that gives Bush more than 81% of the votes and has as most de-
fenders of the political integrism, no others than the predicators of the 
Christian Coalition: Willy Graham, Pat Robertson and Jerry Vimes, as new 
apostles. 
Ervin Kristol one of the founders of the “Neocoms” in his book “Neocon-
servatism: Autobiography of an Idea”  places the origin of the movement in 
the late 60’s as a reaction after the fall of the “American spirit”. When the 
winds of May 68 and the counterculture tried to establish the values of 
pacifism, drugs and permissibity of the hippies. The Vietnam syndrome 
brought the idea that it was imperative to rearm intellectually in order to 
bring back the United States and the Western World to the right track. One 
of the first theorists Norman Podhoretz, who learnt from Leo Strauss and 
Allan Bloom, defended how to be against political relativism and the cul-
tural igualitarism. The path was already set when Ronald Reagan arrived 
and with him the successful victory that set together the extreme techno-Diverging Systems of Governance? 
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logical modernity and the ultra-conservatism in the same patriotic package. 
After Reagan we find the Bush era and with the Bushes their doctrine and 
their power is consolidated during a fearful process well analysed by Peter 
Steinfels in the “New Conservatists: The men who are changing America”, 
and Paul Gottfried: “The conservative movement.” The tools to extend the 
idea have been the “Think Tanks” and the great multimedia communication 
group which have been launching platforms for debate, issues and persons. 
Heritage Foundations; Hudson Institute; Howard Institute; American En-
terprise Institute; Centre for strategic international Studies; Carnegy Ende-
woment for international Peace; Catto Foundation; Rang Corporation, the 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and the influent: Project for 
New American Century. All this institutions in symbiosis with the conser-
vative publications such as Washington Times, Weekly Standard, New Re-
public, National Review, Wall Street Journal, and Commentary among oth-
ers, have been the fundamental divulgation support. They have been so ef-
ficient that have even polluted more open media such as The Washington 
Post, The New York Times, Newsweek and even the magazine Foreign Af-
fairs, whose director is at the present a good friend of the Wilson Centre 
and collaborator of the International Foundation Olof Palme, Moisés Naïm. 
Some of theses publications had to recognize recently they were mistaken 
supporting Iraq’s war without clear reasons. 
And now the question. Is it possible to get over the present crisis in the 
transatlantic relations?; do we actually face insuperable barriers of diverg-
ing system of governance? What I do really think is that a political shift in 
the United States is necessary. Opposite than in the States, the Revolution 
of  May 68 penetrated Europe. Not as much as the youth that invade the 
streets of Paris had dreamt of, but in Europe the ultra-conservative na-
tional-populism had historical precedents and caused great bellicose disas-
ters, violence, human rights violation, poverty,etc., so that is why the civil 
movement rooted on its own deeper than it did in the United States. Pre-
cisely, this deep sleep in which during so many years has lived the civil 
movement in the United States woke up like Snow White when the contro-
versial Michael Moore disguised as Prince kissed her. Now we’ve found 
out there are two Americas: Bush’s and Kerry’s but really there is the Anna Balletbò 
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America of the owners of the world and the America of the citizens of the 
World.  
The future of the relation between the two shores of the Atlantic will de-
pend on the November election. I’m willing to remind you what a French 
official told some time ago to the Secretary of State Madeleine Albright: 
“Mrs. Secretary this will work in the practice but what about in theory? 
This anecdote summarizes what for the Americans and British is the deep 
difference between the way of thinking of the French and the Anglo-
Saxons. Personally I think in the US there is a lack of the “French Factor.” 
One of the most absurd nationalist detail is that the Republicans criticise 
John Kerry because he is able to speak French. A president of the United 
States that can speak French is precisely what Great Britain and Europe 
need, and I could even add that this is what the United States need to repair 
the damage caused by the suicide unilateralism of the Bush’s government if 
this changes, many things will be possible. 
 
 Geert Ahrens 
Diverging Systems of Governance: Not 
a Convincing Explanation of Recent De-
velopments 
I. Introductory Remark 
The following is a personal contribution, and I bear the sole responsibility 
for it. The task is not easy for me. When the Vatican wants to canonize 
someone, it nominates the Devil’s Advocate. This person is tasked with 
collecting evidence against the candidate for canonization, although he 
might revere her. Today, I feel that I have to perform such a devilish role 
when I speak about divergence, after others have dealt with shared values, 
and before the subject of (economic) cooperation will be tabled. My biog-
raphy has not prepared me well for this task because it is characterized by 
the experience of closeness with the United States. A brief description from 
a participant’s perspective seems to be appropriate at this place.  
After having experienced some fire-bombing during the Second World 
War, I witnessed, in my hometown Berlin, the Berlin airlift, when Ameri-
can airplanes became supply planes that we used to call Rosinenbomber 
(bombers carrying raisins). Even as the child I was, I understood that the 
U.S. had saved us from falling prey to a brutal Stalinist dictatorship. In 
1983/1984, I spent one academic year in Harvard, and in 2002-2003, an-
other one at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in 
Washington D.C., both institutions characterized by an impressive intellec-
tual atmosphere, and surrounded by an extraordinary concentration of 
scholarly institutions. This experience has saved me from any cultural arro-
gance Europeans might still feel towards their transatlantic cousins. Since Geert Ahrens 
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Harvard, I have preserved a lively interest in things American. More impor-
tant has been the practical cooperation with Americans during my long ca-
reer in the German diplomatic service. We young Germans took this coop-
eration within the one transatlantic family for granted, and never felt any 
tension between it and the accelerating process of European integration, 
which we supported with equal enthusiasm. The atmosphere of the many 
Western meetings, particularly at NATO HQ in Brussels, differed greatly 
from the sessions of the Socialist Camp. The former were, at least on the 
working level, free-wheeling discussions between close political friends, 
whereas the latter were often not much more than Soviet order issuing ex-
ercises. Western day-to-day cooperation was close and characterized by 
great trust. 
In Hong Kong in the sixties and in Beijing in the seventies, we had frequent 
informal meetings with American (and European) colleagues, and the 
Americans were not always the giving side. In Beijing, the German Em-
bassy assisted, whenever this was appropriate, the fledgling U.S. Liaison 
Office (which only later became an embassy). Its second head was George 
Herbert Walker Bush. As Ambassador in Hanoi in the eighties, I used, to-
gether with my French colleague, and in the absence of a U.S. mission, to 
brief visiting American delegations. We investigated, to the best of our 
possibilities, any sightings of persons who might be American MIAs (they 
were always Cubans). As director for Southeast Asia and the Pacific in 
Bonn, I was, as a matter of course, received twice at the Commander-in-
Chief Pacific in Honolulu. The end of the cold war first brought with it a 
high point of German-American cooperation, when Washington, unlike 
London and Paris, supported the reunification of Germany without any 
hesitation. Having been brought up a few hundred yards from the German-
German border, I could not but feel gratitude, even if the Americans, as 
every one else, pursued their own political interest as they understood it. 
The point was that they indeed understood German reunification as an 
American interest. However, when I started working as a mediator in the 
Balkans in 1991, I felt for the first time that the traditional transatlantic co-
operation began to slacken, and, today, we are having a conference on the 
crisis in transatlantic relations. I do not think, however, that this crisis is a Diverging Systems of Governance 
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consequence of diverging systems -- constitutional, political, or otherwise. 
Let me elaborate on this point. 
II. Constitutional Systems 
First of all, a direct comparison between the United States and Europe is a 
complicated exercise because the objects of comparison are not clear-cut. 
Particularly on the European side, there are many systems in any area of 
governance. What is more, in many aspects, the difference between some 
European countries is greater than the transatlantic distance between some 
of these countries and the United States. The picture gets even more com-
plicated when, on the North American side, we add Canada, which is often 
conveniently forgotten in discussions of transatlantic relations. A look at 
the constitutional systems on both sides of the Atlantic will clarify this 
point further. 
The United States has always been a federation and a democracy of the 
presidential type, and has preserved this system in spite of a number of 
constitutional amendments. The Canadian system differs greatly. It is also 
federal, but the Head of State is a largely ceremonial function performed by 
the monarch of the former colonial power, whereas the chief executive is a 
parliamentary prime minister. If one included the third North American 
country, Mexico, another presidential and federal democracy would have to 
be added, but there is good reason not to do so in the framework of this 
conference. 
The constitutional systems of the EU member states, and of European 
countries outside of the EU, show an enormous variety. Some are federa-
tions, such as Germany, Austria, and Switzerland, and others are central-
ized to varying degrees, with or without the often recent creation of regions 
(France, Italy). As to the form of government, there are presidential sys-
tems, for instance, in France or Russia, and parliamentary democracies, 
where the largely ceremonial head of state may be a monarch (the UK, the 
Benelux countries, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Spain) or a civilian presi-
dent (Germany, Italy, Poland, the Czech Republic). 
This variety shows that the constitutional system as such cannot be at the 
root of transatlantic divergences, because the dividing line is not in the At-Geert Ahrens 
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lantic, and the difference between the constitutional monarchies Canada 
and Spain, on the one side, and the presidential democracies U.S. and 
France, on the other, is greater than that between the American and the 
European examples just given. This refers also to subjective feelings. I am 
a convinced republican and feel uncomfortable with systems that provide 
for a hereditary head of state. In this regard, the U.S. system is closer to my 
political convictions than the British. However, the EU as a structure sui 
generis is at variance with American experience, and has no equivalent on 
the other side of the Atlantic. NAFTA is a mere free trade area. 
The EU system as such is singular and difficult to understand. The Euro-
pean Union is in the process of giving itself a “constitution” that continues 
a development of steady perfection by a number of treaties beginning with 
the Treaties of Rome 1957. Whether, and when, this constitution will be 
ratified and enter into force is an open question that depends, among other 
things, on difficult referendums in some member states. The constitution 
will transform the EU into a subject of international law. However, it will 
not create a super-state, but regulate the ever more complex structures and 
dealings of the Union, while enhancing its transparency and democratic 
legitimacy. Its member states, whose number has been enlarged, on 1 May 
2004, to twenty-five members, will continue to exist as subjects of interna-
tional law, although the post-communist newcomers, and their population, 
may underestimate the degree to which EU membership restricts their re-
cently regained sovereignty. 
Ordinary Americans, if they have heard about the EU, do certainly not have 
a particular affection or interest in it, but, alas, ordinary Europeans, though 
probably somewhat better informed about the EU, would not differ greatly 
from this observation. Both would underestimate the real weight and influ-
ence the EU has gained by today. But this increased weight has its limits, 
particularly in foreign and security policy, as the split European reaction to 
the Iraq war has shown. Besides, the U.S. has traditionally supported the 
process of European unification and even makes recommendations on who 
should become a new member, so that the crisis in transatlantic relations 
seems not to be rooted in the increased international influence of the EU (if 
a larger number of members really strengthens the Union). Besides the Diverging Systems of Governance 
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formal written (in most cases) or unwritten (e.g., the UK) constitutions, 
there may be more distinct differences in the “lived constitution,” i.e., po-
litical practice.   
In most of the European countries, political parties play a much larger role 
than in the United States, and the highly personalized and unique American 
presidential election campaigns baffle Europeans, who are also surprised 
by the low participation in U.S. elections. Consequences of presidential 
elections can also be baffling for Europeans. Not only do ambassadors of-
ten change, but also politics to such an extent that foreign supporters of the 
preceding U.S. policy can really feel left in the lurch with the new admini-
stration. Another difference exists below the level of government, where, in 
Europe, “social partners,” trade unions, business associations, religious 
communities, etc., participate, by consolidated formal processes, in govern-
ance. In the U.S., the system of lobbying is much more informal and im-
penetrable, although both systems may lead to obscurity for the public at 
large. However, here again, differences on the European side are consider-
able. Italy and Germany correspond more to the European model than, for 
instance, the UK. Furthermore, this transatlantic difference has existed for 
decades and predates the crisis we are talking about, so that it cannot be 
one of its causes. The crisis does not stem from different systems, but from 
something more direct. 
III. Power: A Growing Discrepancy 
It is a worn-out formula that the U.S. is the only remaining superpower, but 
it remains true. Without entering into a philosophical discussion of the 
bases of the might of states, in our context, I would mention the military 
first. The U.S. military is not only by far the strongest in the world and 
much stronger than military forces on this side of the Atlantic, but the 
transatlantic gap in military technology and equipment is constantly widen-
ing. Iraq has shown that the U.S. can overpower any foreign army in an 
impressively short time, but may be unable to win the peace thereafter. 
Americans are, normally, the best critics of their own country. I like a sen-
tence that I read some weeks ago in the New York Times Book Review: “To 
fight today’s terrorism with an army is like trying to shoot a cloud of mos-Geert Ahrens 
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quitos with a machine gun.” As terrorism is, for the foreseeable future, the 
main threat to Western values, even some enthusiasts at the Pentagon ought 
to recognize that U.S. military might is reassuring in many, but not all re-
spects. Here, politics comes in. 
In international politics, the U.S. maintains also a very strong and influen-
tial position. According to my own practical experience, this is true for the 
Western Alliance, NATO, but also for world-wide organizations such as 
the United Nations, or regional pacts like the OAS or the OSCE. Although 
this may be resented by many, including certain European states, the word 
of the U.S. representative has an enormous weight in international forums. 
However, there again are limits. Political influence is not always identical 
with political wisdom, but genuine leadership requires such wisdom. In this 
context, the preparation and aftermath of the Iraq war have led to political 
resistance against U.S. policy even by close allies, at the UN in particular, 
and the reputation of American foreign policy and intelligence gathering 
has suffered somewhat. In particular, large European states are not pre-
pared to concede American policy analyses a higher quality of judgment. 
However, the American might is not only based on the military or politics. 
In the economy, there is also a transatlantic gap, although it is more diffi-
cult to understand. By economic indicators, the U.S. and the EU are com-
parable entities. Yet, regarding monetary matters, Alan Greenspan, and not 
Jean-Claude Trichet, takes center stage, and the dollar continues to be the 
leading international reserve currency, although the Euro has begun chal-
lenging this role in some regions. The stock exchanges in Europe are being 
mesmerized by developments in Wall Street. In addition, the American 
economy is, at present, in a better shape than that of the EU and most of its 
member countries. European explanations that the American advantage is 
due to crass social injustice are, in spite of some justification, seldom based 
on serious analysis. Here again, Americans are the better critics of their 
own shortcomings. In the context of social injustice, I think of Barbara 
Ehrenreich’s bestseller Nickle and Dimed, which describes in vivid terms 
the living conditions of those at the low end of the wage scale.  Diverging Systems of Governance 
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Regarding social policy and cohesion, the dramatic fall of European birth-
rates – stronger than in the U.S., where a greater openness to immigration 
helps offset its consequences – has shaken badly the generous European 
social welfare systems, and has led to severe political crises that weaken 
Europe further in comparison to the U.S., where such problems exist, but 
seem to be better under control. All in all, most Americans lack the marked 
pessimism for the future that is wide-spread in Europe.  
The American élan vital expresses itself in many respects, giving the lie to 
a certain cultural arrogance on this side of the Atlantic. Out of ten films I 
see, nine are American; two out of three books I read, are by American au-
thors; and pop culture is largely American-dominated. Some American 
wines can stand up to French or German products. The percentage of bad 
restaurants seems, by now, to be higher in this country than in the U.S. 
Such a strong position of the U.S. in almost all respects creates resentment 
as a natural consequence, and Americans will have to live with it. The vet-
eran German journalist Peter Bender has written a book that contains a di-
rect comparison between the Roman and the American Empires. Consider-
ing my recollections of Roman history, I greatly prefer the Americans, 
who, for instance, are generous victors, to the Romans and their vae victis. 
Some individuals who think that the grandeur of their country is their per-
sonal merit, and that Europeans have only themselves to blame for their 
decadence, are a fact of life but also, fortunately, good laughing stock. 
More serious may be the belief that a powerful country like the U.S. is 
most powerful alone.  
IV. International Integration 
Shared sovereignty, which has become commonplace to experienced mem-
bers of the EU, is not a popular concept in the U.S., who relies on its own 
political wisdom and strength, and whose citizens visit foreign countries 
not nearly as often as Europeans. National pride is highly developed. Re-
cently, in the U.S., I saw a frequent TV spot in which about a dozen per-
sons of different racial origin tell the spectator one after the other, proudly: 
“I am an American.” To imagine such an “ich bin ein Deutscher”-campaign 
on German television borders the ludicrous, and even in France, which has Geert Ahrens 
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a more relaxed attitude towards its own history than Germany, I could not 
imagine a corresponding „je suis Français“-exercise. 
This concept of its own national role has an influence on all international or 
global enterprises that might affect American sovereignty, although the 
U.S. is, as a rule, not principally opposed to them. To mention a few well-
covered issues: The International Criminal Court (ICC), established with 
lukewarm U.S.-support in 1998 by the Rome Statute, has, after the Statute 
entered into force four years later, led to an open transatlantic row under a 
new U.S. administration, in which both sides sought the support of the baf-
fled post-communist states of Eastern Europe, and pressured them unfairly. 
Similar issues concerned the World Trade Organization and its rights, in-
terventions in third countries without a UN mandate, the global environ-
ment and the Kyoto protocol, or common policies on immigration and asy-
lum. On all these issues, Europeans are readier to forego certain aspects of 
their sovereignty than Americans, but also often lack understanding for 
specific American interests. This transatlantic difference (with Canada on 
this side of the Atlantic) is exacerbated, when the American practice shows 
disregard for the underlying concerns.  
I hesitate to name these focuses of European anti-Americanism even in my 
role as the Devil’s Advocate, but they belong in this context. Let me make 
three examples.  
(One) To begin with the judiciary, I can understand American concerns that 
U.S. personnel, who often are necessary to resolve international crises in 
the interest of the international community, may be tried by a panel of, as 
Washington fears, biased foreign judges. However, this understanding suf-
fers if the U.S. itself does not consistently observe the highest standards of 
human rights (Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo) expected by Europeans.  
(Two) Leaving out the complicated WTO issues, I feel that an intervention 
without UN authorization is a serious matter because it could undermine 
the great progress that the 1945 Charter has created with regard to the le-
gitimacy or not of warfare, an achievement that has a considerable signifi-
cance for Europe and its bloody 20
th Century history. In this regard, great-
est caution is necessary, and poor assessment and intelligence must not oc-Diverging Systems of Governance 
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cur. Unfortunately, this is not the place for a detailed discussion of the im-
portant initiative by the UN Secretary-General and others that goes under 
the name of The Responsibility to Protect. 
(Three) As to the global environment, Europeans resent the non-acceptance 
of the Kyoto protocol by the country with the highest per capita energy 
consumption and, in comparison, very low energy prices. In my rented 
house in Maryland, I was surprised that windows could hardly be opened, 
and when I wanted to heat or air-condition one room, I could not but do 
this in ten rooms, i.e., the entire house. It is difficult to change such estab-
lished behaviour, but some beginning and some more good will would cer-
tainly be welcome on this side of the Atlantic. 
However, none of the aforementioned three points of divergence explains a 
real crisis in transatlantic relations. The one real change in the political en-
vironment, the end of the Cold War, has, in my view, not ended the transat-
lantic community of interests. Both sides would be well advised to take 
each other’s interests into careful consideration, and continue their tradi-
tional cooperation. These common interests are the fight against terrorism 
(or “war on terror”), good governance and the rule of law wherever possi-
ble, free trade and world-wide economic health, and meaningful cultural 
exchange. Against this background, conflicts will not be lacking and ill 
feelings may crop up here and there, but we continue to have much in 
common. In any case, everything should be done to avoid primitive anti-
Americanism on this side of the Atlantic, and lack of consideration for the 
interests or feelings of “Old Europe,” or arrogance, on the other. I am, after 
all, optimistic. 
  
Robert Wade 
US and European Relations with       
Developing Countries: Aid, Trade, and 
Investment 
“I’m a bit of a protectionist myself in the sense, if our jobs are going to 
India, we’ve got to get some kind of compensatory adjustment from 
them”  (Ray Pagett, Walton County [Florida] Democratic Party chairman, 
retired Coca-Cola executive who spent three years in Vienna, quoted in 
John Vinocur, “The Redneck Riviera, where Bush can’t lose”, Interna-
tional Herald Tribune, August 31, 2004) 
“The US has yet to comply with a growing list of other WTO judgements 
against its trade policies and some Congress members say the ratio be-
tween its ‘wins’ and ‘losses’ in the organization is becoming unbalanced” 
(“Trade: Fresh road map to help find the exit”, Special Survey, Financial 
Times, October 1, 2004. 
The aid programs of the US and of European states have changed sub-
stantially over time, and are now quite similar in the sorts of activities 
they support.1 This is not the result of active cooperation, however, but of 
the growing centrality of the World Bank in defining notions of “appro-
priate” activities for aid. Aid, though, is a minor part of the economic re-
lations between the US and Europe, on the one hand, and developing 
countries on the other. Trade and investment are much more important. 
Here the US and European states, especially the Group of Seven (G7), 
have indeed been cooperating to establish global rules of trade and in-
vestment. But I shall argue that their cooperation is not necessarily a good 
thing in terms of a “world interest”. The rules tip the playing field of the 
world economy even more against developing countries than in the past, 
 
1 For comments I thank without implicating Paul Isenman, of the OECD Develop-
ment Center, and Michael Lipton.  Robert Wade 
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even as much publicized disputes erupt in US-Europe trade. The US and 
Europe are cooperating, in other words, to lock-in their oligopolistic ad-
vantages at the top of the world income hierarchy. 
US and European Aid: Similarities and Differences 
 
Figure 1 shows the trends in aid volumes from the EU, Japan and the US, 
from 1990 onwards. The US has by far the lowest percentage of Gross 
National  Income – though the percentage has increased slightly during 
the Bush II administration.  
US aid 
Political support for aid has been weaker in the US than in Europe. The 
idea of the US government giving aid has always run up against a strong 
liberal tradition which sees the use of tax-payers’ money for charitable 
purposes as basically wrong. US Marshall Plan aid after World War II (2 
% of GDP for several years) was a big exception, propelled by the strat-
egy for containing communism and by the need to find customers for 
American exports. However, the US does give far more private aid—
NGO and foundation—than anyone else.     
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The US presidential system, with a legislature wide open to lobbying 
groups, has given the executive branch less leeway to pursue objectives—
such as a generous aid program—viewed with suspicion by influential 
parts of the electorate. In the population at large, the sort of attitude cap-
tured by the speaker in my first epigraph is typical.  The US Congress, 
more than other legislatures, micromanages aid so as to reward domestic 
as well as foreign favorites.    
US aid has for decades been divided into two streams. One is the overtly 
political stream to Israel and Egypt, which is largely a cheque-writing ex-
ercise, with more or less automatic quantities. The other is the more or-
thodox “development assistance” program for everyone else. In the mid 
1970s this switched to an explicit focus on “poverty reduction”, with a 
sharp emphasis on “results on the ground”. For a time, USAID had by far 
the best delivery system of any aid donor, with strong aid missions 
staffed by professionals, and elaborate attention to “M&E” (monitoring 
and evaluation).  But over the 1980s and 1990s, as political support for 
aid shrank, the whole aid delivery system shrank too.  
Now USAID is staffed mainly by contract managers, who contract out the 
work to the “private sector”. Highly qualified young Americans do still 
flock to it out of a sense of “doing good for the world” (and it pays better 
than NGOs or teaching), and provide it with some continuing in-house 
technical expertise. But they do not rise up the hierarchy.  
The content of aid has become more tied to ideological and foreign policy 
objectives; in particular, democratisation and private sector development.  
European aid   
European states have a stronger social democratic tradition, which sees 
income redistribution through the state as morally just—including even to 
poor non-citizens in poor countries. In general, those who care more 
about equality and social cohesion at home care more about these values 
abroad as well. Hence the much higher proportion of European GDP 
given as aid than in the US. European  parliamentary systems give more 
scope for executive action—including on aid--free of restrictions imposed 
by representatives of special interest groups.  
European states vary widely in terms of how much emphasis they give to 
aid effectiveness. Quite a lot in Germany; not much in Italy.  The aid pro-Robert Wade 
  46   
grams tend to be run out of embassies (not separate aid missions), and by 
generalists rather than aid specialists. The aid tends to be less ideological 
and more geared to paving the way for European exports. (The aid pro-
grams of the UK and Scandinavia are partial exceptions to these generali-
zations.)  
But nowadays a lot of European aid goes not through bilateral programs 
but through multilateral development banks and the European Commis-
sion, both of which are more strongly oriented to “development” objec-
tives and give more attention to effectiveness.  The Poverty Reduction 
and Strategy Papers (PRSPs), which the World Bank and the IMF require 
to be written by borrower countries (with heavy input by those organiza-
tions, in many cases), have provided a focal point for US and European 
aid cooperation.   
European and US convergence on the aid agenda 
Despite the several kinds of differences, the US and European aid agen-
das are broadly similar in the kinds of activities that receive support. In 
particular, both sets of donors have moved away from support for directly 
productive sectors; aid to agriculture, for instance, has fallen by two 
thirds as a share of total aid since 1980, even though 60 percent or more 
of the world’s poor depend on agriculture. Rather, they converge on aid 
for the “social” agenda, including primary (but not tertiary) education, 
primary health care, together with “institutional reform” to do with the 
judiciary, police, and the like.  
The reasons are several, but include the growing centrality of the World 
Bank in defining the “appropriate” sectors for aid, partly via the PRSP 
process just mentioned but also via wider processes of legitimation. US 
international NGOs, influential in Congress and the executive branch, are 
keenly interested in the “social” sectors but not much interested in pro-
duction. They have helped to promote the social agenda as the appropri-
ate agenda in the eyes of the US state, which has shifted the agenda of the 
World Bank accordingly, which has shifted the agenda of bilateral agen-
cies in the same direction. As an official of the German Development 
Bank explains,    
“We here at the German Development Bank just copy the World Bank 
arguments on world poverty whenever we can, and we treat what the US and European Relations with Developing Countries 
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Bank writes as if it were the holy scripture itself and we were hardcore 
Methodists. The German Ministry for Cooperation obliges us to highlight 
in every report on our development projects the effect the project has or 
will have on reducing the Millennium Development Goal-1 (MDG-1), 
Poverty Reduction.  Projects where this impact is only indirect, as with 
"transport" or "energy", are considered "bad" or "useless". Moreover, 
our minister uses the "one-dollar-per-day" rhetoric whenever a TV-
camera is turned on. 
I find it unfortunate that there is so little discussion of the flaws of World 
Bank statistics and theories and policies within the institutions of bilateral 
development such as mine. The "Bank" is our quasi-holy benchmark and 
nobody questions it. Maybe the World Bank should adopt the motto of 
the Spanish State Emblem that dates back to the times of Carlos the Fifth: 
"Non plus ultra".
2 
US aid and European aid since the Bush II administration 
Since 2000 and the advent of the Bush II administration, the differences 
between US and European approaches have sharpened.  The US has em-
phasised the need to switch from loans to grants; has cut its aid budget 
(with the apparent exception of the Millennium Challenge Account, see 
below); has given no support to developing country governments for 
trade negotiations (eg in the WTO); and insists on giving (most of ) its aid 
in project-by-project form, rather than in government budget support, and 
with much of the aid being channelled through the national affiliates or 
branches of US-based NGOs.  
European states, by contrast, continue to support aid in the form of subsi-
dized loans (rather than grants); support higher aid amounts; do give sup-
port to developing country governments in trade negotiations 3; and do 
give aid in the form of general budget support once they approve  the 
government’s budget priorities.  
 
2 Official of German Development Bank, who requested anonymity. Emphasis added. 
3 At the end of the disastrous Cancun ministerial meeting of the WTO the German 
minister for agriculture yelled at the German aid minister (he could equally have 
been yelling at the UK aid minister), “See what you did!”,  referring to the help that 
Germany and other European states had given to developing country governments 
in stiffening their negotiating position.  Robert Wade 
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The mode of delivery  
The last point needs qualification. It is mainly the northern European and 
UK governments who talk of budget support as an important principle for 
supporting the government’s policy-making capacity; the other European 
governments are not so keen. And in any case, the northern Europeans 
and the UK  act behind the talk, since they too feel obliged to have a way 
of pressing domestic interests in aid projects. The European Commission 
does give a substantial proportion of its aid in the form of budget support, 
because it is more insulated from particular national interests.    
The US is out of step with the recent European emphasis on channelling 
aid through the public budget. The US is adamant that it will not do so. In 
the name of “accountability”, it insists on separate quarterly and annual 
reports for each of its aid projects. If it has 20 projects in a country, this 
may generate some 200 meetings with government officials a year. For an 
already overstretched African or Central Asian government, the use of 
scarce manpower for these purposes is not necessarily optimal.4 Also, this 
mode of aid delivery tends to skew the priorities of line ministries to-
wards those of the aid donor, so as to attract more project finance—on 
which the ministry’s budget increasingly depends. Moreover, to the ex-
tent that the project aid is channelled through NGOs, especially US-based 
NGOs, the national government has no say over the priorities, and may 
not even know what is being done on its territory.  
The US’s Millennium Challenge Account 
The Bush administration’s Millennium Challenge Account seems to be an 
exception to the general picture of US aid. Bush announced at the Mon-
terrey ministerial meeting of the WTO, in 2002 (in the wake of 9/11), that 
the US government would create an aid fund—called the Millennium 
Challenge Account--that would quickly grow to  $5 billion a year . The 
money would be given in the form of grants with few conditions to gov-
ernments that met a series of criteria, including good governance, invest-
ment in education, and economic freedoms. Each qualifying government 
 
4 US aid officials claim that much of the reporting work is done in-house or by their 
own contractors, which saves the government a lot of work; but it also by-passes 
the government and contributes to the government not knowing what is going on in 
its own territory. US and European Relations with Developing Countries 
  49
could receive up to $300 million a year in additional aid beyond its cur-
rent assistance from the US. 5 
This initiative seems to promise a substantial improvement in US aid per-
formance. Certainly, it still has the US “cherry picking” countries for US 
aid, but cherry picking on development capacity grounds rather than the 
more usual political grounds—which is an improvement. However, 
Bush’s announcement came out of the blue, with no discussion within the 
administration and no supporting plan. Nearly two years on, no money 
has yet been spent. The Congress has slashed the originally announced 
amount in half, and has not even appropriated the reduced amount. A lot 
of even this much reduced amount will probably end up being just a re-
packaging of existing aid dollars, not a net addition. The money will 
probably continue to be channelled through NGOs, because of the force 
of the idea that US aid should be used to “support individuals, not gov-
ernments”.  And none will go to agencies that support birth control pro-
grams, including those that promote the use of that other weapon of mass 
destruction, the condom.  
The rise of Evangelicals in the aid business 
US aid has long been opposed to birth control and abortion programs, and 
opposition has intensified under the Bush administration. This reflects the 
stronger influence of Evangelical Christians in  US politics, and Bush’s 
own commitment to Evangelical values. White Protestants who describe 
themselves as evangelical or born--again make up one quarter of the elec-
torate, more than blacks and Hispanics put together. The White House, 
the cabinet, and the US Congress contain a strong Evangelical presence.6 
The administration has created new Centers For Faith-Based and Com-
munity Initiatives (CFCI) in five departments and in USAID, each shaped 
by Evangelicals. These centers are especially charged with increasing the 
role of “faith-based organizations” (FBOs) in partnering the federal and 
 
5 Glenn Kessler, “Reinventing U.S. foreign aid at Millennium Challenge Corp.”, 
Washington Post, 9 Aug 04.  
6 For example, Karl Rove, Bush’s chief political strategist; Michael Gerson, Bush’s 
speech writer; John Ashcroft, Attorney General; Sen. Tommy Thompson, Health 
and Human Service Secretary; Ron Paige, Education Secretary; Robert Polito, di-
rector of the Faith-based and Community Initiatives Center at Dept. of Health and 
Human Services; Tom DeLay, majority leader of House of Representatives; and so 
on.   Robert Wade 
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state governments in all welfare work, including foreign aid. The FBOs in 
receipt of federal funding are allowed to retain religious autonomy over 
their governance and to display religious symbols and preach religious 
messages as they like. (The guarantee of freedom of religion in interna-
tional human rights law has no counterpart guarantee of freedom from 
religion.)  
For Evangelicals, “anti-abortion” (or “pro-life”) and “abstinence” (as dis-
tinct from “birth control” or “safe sex”) are litmus tests, sine qua non.7 In 
this spirit, the administration has refused funding to both the International 
Planned Parenthood Federation and the United Nations Population Fund 
on the basis that they do not council against abortion. In particular, the 
administration justified its decision to stop funding the UN Population 
Fund on the grounds that it supports forced abortion and sterilisation in 
China—despite an independent assessment finding no evidence of such 
support. It has also cut funding to Marie Stopes International because of 
its involvement with the UN Population Fund, and threatens UNICEF 
that its funding will be cut if it does not stop working with the Population 
Fund. In June 2004 the administration withdrew support for an interna-
tional health conference on the grounds that the conference included 
speakers from the Population Fund and the International Planned Parent-
hood Federation. 8  In effect, then, most of the US government’s aid for 
international reproductive health—and also for HIV/AIDs 9—is going 
through faith-based organizations committed to “abstinence” and “pro-
choice”.    
This is despite evidence that criminalizing abortions makes them unsafe 
but does not eliminate them. Unsafe abortions account for 15% of mater-
nal deaths worldwide, and most unsafe abortions occur where they are 
illegal. Half of abortions in developing countries are illegal.  
 
7 The Evangelical influence—as seen in state laws that attempt to govern even the 
consensual sexual behavior of citizens--goes far back in US history. Ten US states 
still have “anti-fornication” statutes, which make premarital sex a criminal offence. 
Twenty four US states have “anti-adultery” statutes, which make adultery a crimi-
nal offence. In August 2004, a town attorney in Virginia was sentenced to commu-
nity service after pleading guilty to adultery.  If the jurors were a representative 
sample, over half of them  had themselves committed adultery.    
8 New York Times, June 21, 2004.  US and European Relations with Developing Countries 
  51
The US government’s antipathy to condoms and other means of birth 
control and its zealous promotion of abstinence before marriage for the 
citizens of the world is not shared in Europe. However, the World Bank, 
inspired by the US example, is now considering how it can increase its 
use of FBOs as channels for its Multi Country AIDS Program.   
The influence of  US Evangelicals on the US aid program is not limited to 
anti-abortion and abstinence. They have within the past several years be-
come much more engaged in broader aid issues than in the past, and have 
even encouraged an increase in US aid—for the purpose of promoting 
Evangelical values. The US aid program is increasingly set by an improb-
able “Baptist-Bootlegger” coalition of Evangelicals (Jerry Falwell), far-
right conservatives (Jesse Helmes), pop stars (Bono), and civil society 
NGOs (Oxfam).    
US and EU Cooperation in Framing the Rules of the 
World Economy in Their Favor 
 Aid, as I said, is small change compared to flows of trade and foreign 
investment. The US and the EU have been cooperating well, for the most 
part, in setting the rules; but the net result is not good for developing 
countries.  
The WTO 
Take the WTO for example. The rules of the WTO are made largely by 
the US and European states and then presented to other states for ratifica-
tion. 10  They have framed the major agreements of the past decade—such 
as the Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs), Trade-Related Intel-
lectual Property Rights (TRIPs), General Agreement on Services 
(GATS), and Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM).  
 
9 Of the administration’s $3 bn. HIV/AIDs budget for the five years from 2003,  33% 
was earmarked for programs to teach the value of sexual abstinence before mar-
riage.   
10 Wade, “The ringmaster of Doha”,  New Left Review, 25, Jan/Feb 2004; Fatoumata 
Jawara and Aileen Kwa, Behind the Scenes at the WTO: The Real World of Inter-
national Trade Negotiations, Zed Books, 2003.  Robert Wade 
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These agreements contain a striking asymmetry.11 On the one hand they 
classify as “prohibited” or “actionable” a whole series of industrial policy 
measures that are directly relevant for expanding production capacity in 
selected industries, especially capacity controlled by domestic firms. The 
TRIMs, for example, prohibits local content requirements, trade balanc-
ing requirements, foreign exchange balancing requirements, domestic 
sales limits (which restrict a foreign-invested firm from selling more than 
a certain proportion of output on the domestic market). Such measures 
were extensively used in East Asia (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, to some 
extent the Southeast Asian states), and were almost certainly important 
for their successful development—they being the most successful devel-
opers of the post-war era.12 These industrial policy measures remain rele-
vant  today for developing country governments trying to accelerate their 
country’s presence in industries that are already well established on a 
world scale.  In this sense the WTO rules restrict the “policy space” of 
developing country states.    
On the other hand, the WTO agreements give plenty of scope for other 
kinds of industrial policies that are more relevant to the knowledge-
intensive industries and technologies that the core OECD states are each 
trying to promote within their own territory. (In these industries, support 
for closely linked suppliers of inputs and demanders of output, and for 
conducive institutional frameworks, is more relevant than direct support 
for production expansion, as in the older industries of more relevance to 
developing countries.)  
For example, the TRIMS permits subsidies for venture capital financing 
of high tech startup firms, for infrastructure and financial support for high 
tech exports, for financing of “pre-commercial” technologies and product 
development, transfers of intellectual property rights, government pro-
curement to stimulate local demand for domestic products (eg IT and 
telecommunications). The point about government procurement is espe-
 
11 Linda Weiss, “Global Governance, National Strategies: How industrialised states 
make room to move under the WTO”,  Government and International Relations, 
School of Economics and Political Science, University of Sydney, July 2003.   
Wade, “What strategies are viable for developing countries today? The WTO and 
the shrinking of ‘development space’”,  Review of International Political Econ-
omy, 10, 4, 2003.   
12 Wade, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in 
East Asia’s Industrialization, Princeton University Press, 2004 [1990].  US and European Relations with Developing Countries 
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cially important, because government procurement purchases account for 
some 20% of GDP in OECD countries. Also, the rules give much scope 
under the rubric of “national security”. The US government, for example, 
retains the authority within the WTO rules to control foreign direct in-
vestment (FDI) by giving the president discretion to prohibit or otherwise 
shape FDI in the interests of “national security”.  The criteria of relevance 
for determining national security are left completely unspecified, open to 
the president to decide case by case. For example, with this authority the 
president prohibited the purchase of a US tyre company linked to US de-
fence firms, by a French firm.   
In short, the WTO rules—that the US and the European states cooperated 
to frame—permit countries to use industrial policy instruments suitable 
for knowledge-intensive industries and technologies.  In this sense the 
WTO has become “an upgrading device for developed economies”, in 
Linda Weiss’s words.13 On the other hand, WTO rules prohibit or make 
actionable other instruments that are of declining use to developed 
economies but of much use to developing countries. For the US and 
Europe, this is “win-win”.  
Indeed, the situation is even better for the US and Europe. They  have 
managed to frame trade negotiations with developing countries as an ex-
change of (a) expanded access to their markets for agricultural exports 
from developing countries, plus reduced subsidies to their own agricul-
tural producers, in return for (b) expanded access to developing country 
markets for manufactured goods, services, and FDI from rich countries.  
This would tend to preserve their advantages at the top of the world in-
come hierarchy by deepening the specialization of developing countries 
in activities with low income elasticity of demand, and deepening their 
own specialization in activities with high income elasticity of demand. As 
a result, developing countries either keep hitting a balance of payments 
constraint and have to maintain a relatively low rate of growth, or they 
finance their growth with foreign savings and open themselves to the 
likelihood of financial crisis.  
Then Europe and the US, having managed to frame the negotiations in 
this way, have demanded prompt action by developing countries on part 
(b), while dragging their heels on part (a).  Dragging their heels to the 
 
13 Weiss, 2003. Robert Wade 
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point where in September 2004 an editorial in the International Herald 
Tribune  reports that, “The European Union’s … member states…are 
coming to terms with the fact that the status quo is unsustainable, that the 
industrialized world cannot continue to have it both ways by benefiting 
from a global trading system that forces poor countries to lower their bar-
riers to manufactured goods and services while insulating its own farmers 
from global competition”.  Note the use of the present continuing tense!14 
Then, at the next round of negotiations--after developing countries’ have 
moved to liberalize access to their markets for the North’s manufactures 
and services while the North has not done much to meet its commitments-
- the US and the EU say to the developing countries, “In this new round 
you must make some more concessions to us. You can’t expect us to act 
without reciprocity on your part. ” (Recall the spirit of the two epigraphs.) 
Lacking leadership and  out-manoeuvred in the big things in the WTO, 
the developing countries have tended to accede. When, at the WTO sub-
ministerial negotiating round in Geneva in July, India and Brazil began to 
exercise leadership and coordinate developing country positions, they 
were called obstructionist by US and European delegates.15   
The danger for developing countries outside Asia is compounded by the 
rise of China as the major center for the production of low-wage manu-
factured goods, which knocks out production capacity in other developing 
countries—including in Latin America. In the words of The Financial 
Times, “a paradigm shift may be underway as Latin America moves away 
from efforts at economic diversification back to its area of historic com-
parative advantage—agricultural and industrial commodities”.16  
Developing country negotiators should be negotiating not only for im-
proved market access for agriculture but also for more scope to pursue 
industrial policies that upgrade their own industries and escape the trap of 
commodity supplier. But so far the US and the European states are coop-
erating quite effectively to block them, with aid programs as the sweet-
ener. Their cooperation is masked by the well-publicized disputes be-
 
14 Wade, “Held hostage by the anti-development round”, Financial Times, 29 August, 
2003. 
15 Wade, “The WTO still has a long way to go”, International Herald Tribune, 2 Au-
gust 2004. 
16 Richard Lapper, “China begins to exert its influence on Latin America”, Financial 
Times, 26 Sep 2003. US and European Relations with Developing Countries 
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tween them in the WTO, in which the European Union has won several 
cases against the US—to the point where Congressional personnel are 
briefing the press that the US may leave the WTO when a reauthorisation 
bill comes before the Congress in 2005. 17 This is very unlikely, because 
the gains from US and European cooperation in setting the rules in their 
mutual favor are huge. 18   
The IMF 
Europe and the US are being assisted in pushing their common interest in 
opening up developing countries to their goods and firms and capital by 
the IMF.  Now that the IMF cannot, post Asian crisis, continue to demand 
that developing countries open their capital accounts to the free move-
ment of capital, its catch-cry has become “flexible labor markets”. The 
managing director, Rodrigo de Rato, “can’t seem to stop off an airplane 
without urging the local government to introduce more flexibility into 
labor markets”—notwithstanding recent OECD research that shows that 
employment protection policies of the kind Mr Renato wants universally 
abolished have not only efficiency costs, but also social benefits which 
Renato ignores.19  
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 Paul Magnusson, “The WTO loses friends on the Hill”, BusinessWeek, September 
2, 2004.  
18 These trends in the world rules for trade and investment would be less worrying if 
world income distribution was becoming more equal. Some analysts, including the 
World Bank, claim that it is (since about  1980). For contrary evidence see Wade, 
“Is globalization reducing poverty and inequality?”, World Development, 32, 4, 
2004; “On the causes of increasing poverty and inequality, or why the Matthew 
Effect prevails”, New Political Economy, 9, 2, June 2004; “The invisible hand of 
the American empire”, Ethics and International Affairs, 17, 2, 2003.    
19 John Schmitt, “Lessons for the IMF: sometimes efficiency is not the best meas-
ure”, International Herald Tribune, September 30, 2004. The OECD research is 
reported in the OECD’s  Employment Outlook, 2004.   Robert Wade 
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Developing country governments would be wise to show Mr Renato this 
research.  And to continue to stress the ways that the elites of the rich 
world, in their own longer-run interest, do have an interest in promoting a 
more equitable distribution of world income. 20 
 
 
20 I do not doubt that some of the restrictions imposed by the WTO on what develop-
ing country governments can do are a good thing in terms of development. For in-
stance, Indians would surely benefit in the aggregate from having some foreign in-
surance firms provide insurance; the existing monopoly structure of protected In-
dian insurance firms hurts the poor as well as the middle-class. But even in these 
cases, there remains the question about appropriate ways of getting things done—
whether by G7 organizations requiring compliance (eroding sovereignty) or by in-
ternal political pressure. There is no right answer.    
Elke Thiel 
Prospects for Economic Cooperation: 
Trade and Monetary Policy 
Overall Observation 
The transatlantic economic relationship is functioning smoothly, espe-
cially when compared with the frequent political quarrels that have 
strained the Atlantic Alliance in recent years. Trade conflicts have been 
prevented from escalation, although sometimes at the last minute. The 
euro has not challenged the key currency role of the dollar. The European 
Union has implemented the first round of Eastern enlargement which also 
eases American business in the new member states. Rival regional eco-
nomic approaches have continued to be a matter of serious concern, such 
as the All-American Free Trade Area and the intended free trade agree-
ment between the EU and Mercosur or American and European regional 
endeavors in East Asia. Yet it seems to be understood on both sides that 
deeper regional cooperation should go hand in hand with deregulation in 
global trade. The US and the EU worked together in launching the Doha 
Round after September 11. The Doha negotiation frame was just con-
cluded in Geneva at the end of July. In contrast to the Uruguay Round, 
the US and the EU seem to be very considerate not to impede negotia-
tions by their bilateral dispute on agricultural policy. They have agreed on 
a framework for a joint approach on agricultural questions in the WTO.
  
Regarding prevailing perceptions of a “Transatlantic Crisis,” these may 
be encouraging observations. The transatlantic economic relationship is 
certainly not free from grievances, but the basis is very solid.   
The Transatlantic Economy 
The United States and the European Union are the two regions in the 
world economy, which are most closely linked. The high level of eco-
nomic integration would, in fact, justify the term “transatlantic economy.” Elke Thiel 
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On both parts, transatlantic trade amounts to about 20 percent of overall 
foreign trade. More than 50 percent of foreign investment in the US 
comes from the European Union and the EU shares about 45 percent of 
American investment abroad. The relationship is profound, essentially 
balanced and profitable. It involves numerous, mostly anonymous trans-
actions and actors from all parts of the US and the EU and throughout the 
societies. More than three million EU citizens work for American owned 
enterprises in Europe; vice versa, every twelfth employee in the United 
States has a European employer.
1   
The outstanding importance of the economic relationship has been explic-
itly acknowledged in the New Transatlantic Agenda of 1995, and re-
ceived distinguished treatment by the “Transatlantic Economic Partner-
ship” of 1998. Official steering committees and specialized working 
groups have been established to identify still existing trade and invest-
ment impediments and to recommend adequate remedies. American and 
European business leaders have participated in the project from the be-
ginning and have made substantially contributions. Consultation includes 
all kind of official and private partners and mirrors the broad range of is-
sues involved. A dialogue of this depth and dense may not be found be-
tween any other regions.  
Due to the high level of transatlantic integration, differences in domestic 
regulations and standards have become a major concern. Such barriers are 
systematically dealt with in a Roadmap for Regulatory Cooperation and 
Transparency, meant to minimize regulatory divergences. A Financial 
Markets Regulatory Dialogue has been established to promote the crea-
tion of an effective transatlantic capital market.   
About 98 percent of  transatlantic business transactions are trouble-free. 
When trade disputes hit the headlines, the contentious issues are marginal 
in proportion to the volume and value of the overall trade - no more than 
two percent. Although volumes are small, such conflicts can cause severe 
damages, however. In a survey of the European American Business 
 
1   Stefan Fröhlich, Die transatlantische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft. In: Internationale 
Politik, 57(April 2002)4, pp. 31-36 (35) Prospects for Economic Cooperation 
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Council, almost all business leaders considered the resolving of transat-
lantic trade disputes the highest priority issue.
2  
Trade Disputes and Grievances 
Trade disputes have occurred time and again in the transatlantic relation-
ship. Almost all followed the same pattern: After a period of dangerous 
escalation, the quarrel is being resolved by a bilateral, last minute com-
promise. Since the dispute settlement bodies of the WTO have been es-
tablished, the US and the EU have, more and more, requested a WTO rul-
ing on contested issues. In the long lasting disputes about hormone 
treated beef and bananas, the United States, for instance, received the 
backing of the WTO for her claims. In various other cases, WTO ruling 
supported the claims of the EU. The EU, for instance, received authoriza-
tion in 2002 to use countermeasures in compensation for US safeguards 
on imported steel and in retaliation of the US Foreign Sales Cooperation 
legislation (FSC). But such measures were only applied in a very limited 
way in the latter case. In the steel case, the EU abstained from sanctions 
on an American announcement that a significant number of steel products 
might be excluded from the safeguards.  
The dispute over the US Foreign Sales Corporation tax break has caused 
serious worries in the transatlantic business community. US legislation 
eliminates certain income from foreign subsidiaries from taxation, which 
has been deemed an illegal export subsidy by the WTO in February 2000. 
The legislation has been replaced by the Extraterritorial Income Exclu-
sion Act (ETI), but not modified in substance.
3 In a ruling of August 
2002, the WTO authorized the European Union to impose tariffs in the 
amount of $ 4 billion on American products in return. Penalties of this 
scale would, certainly, harm businesses in the US and the EU as well. The 
European Trade Commissioner, Pascal Lamy, at once declared that sanc-
 
2   Statement of William M. Berry, President of the European American Business 
Council in the Hearing on “The U.S.-European Relationship: Opportunities and 
Challenges”, before the Subcommittee on Europe of the Committee on Interna-
tional Relations. House of Representatives, One Hundred Seventh Congress, First 
Session, April 25, 2001, pp. 28-30 (29) (Serial No. 107-9)   
3   In January 2002, the WTO Appellate Body thus ruled that the revised legislation 
was not in compliance with WTO ruling of February 2000. In March 2003, the 
WTO again endorsed EU request for coutermeasures. For this and other cases see: 
European Union, Factsheet, US Non-Compliance with WTO Rulings. EU-
Publication on the occasion of the EU-US Summit, June 26, 2004. Elke Thiel 
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tions would not be imposed immediately, so that the American Congress 
would have sufficient time to revise the legislation after the 2002 elec-
tion. As the issue remained pending, the EU finally introduced some lim-
ited sanctions on May 1, 2004.
4  
In June 2004 the US House of Representatives adopted the so-called Tho-
mas bill repealing the Foreign Sales Corporation and Exterritorial Income 
scheme. A similar bill passed the Senate already in May. Commissioner 
Pascal Lamy expressed relief and the expectation that a revised legisla-
tion will come in force soon. The EU will withdraw sanctions at the same 
moment.
5   
The fact that both parts currently tend to request WTO arbitration for the 
clarification of their claims enhances objectivity and may help taking ac-
rimony out of the conflict. Moreover, the European Union has indicated 
that sanctions, once authorized be the WTO, will only be applied as a last 
resort.  
A number of other legislations, where compliance with WTO ruling still 
has to be achieved, are pending in the US Congress, however, including 
the repeal of the so-called Byrd Amendment (Continued Dumping and 
Subsidy Offset Act) of October 2000.
6 The Act provides that proceeds 
from anti-dumping and countervailing duties shall be paid to the US 
companies, having filed the case. Since payments tend to concentrate on 
few recipients, they have distorting effects on international competition. 
The Act is incompatible with several WTO provisions. The deadline for 
implementing WTO ruling on the matter was December 2003. In addition 
to the European Union, six other WTO partners have asked for the au-
thorization of countermeasures, Brazil, Canada, India, Korea, and Mex-
ico.  
The European Commission monitors advancement of the crucial legisla-
tions and may again appeal again to the WTO, if an issue is overly de-
layed. Regarding strong anti-WTO feelings in US Congress and in both 
 
4   The introduction of an additional customs duty of 5% on a list of US products, 
followed by automatic, monthly increases by 1% up to a ceiling of 17% to be 
reached on 1 March 2005, if compliance has not happened in the meantime. 
5   European Union, News Release, No. 102704, June 17, 2004. 
http://www.eurunion.org/ News/press/2004/200400102.htm 
6   See: European Union, Factsheet, US Non-Compliance with WTO Rulings, op.cit. Prospects for Economic Cooperation 
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parties, the transatlantic trade relationship might thus become more 
strained in the course of the election campaign.  
The dollar-euro relationship 
The euro is now in existence for nearly six years. Twelve EU member 
states currently share a single currency. In contrast to premature suspi-
cions, the impact of the euro has been minor on the dollar and, above all, 
in no way detrimental. Experts agree that the euro has the potential for 
adopting major key currency functions. At the eve of the monetary union, 
many predicted, that the euro would advance as a global currency rela-
tively soon. As the weak euro valuation in the initial years followed by a 
moderate appreciation indicate, currency diversification between the dol-
lar and the euro must have been very gradual. The position of the dollar 
as the preeminent international currency is not being challenged.  
Potential causes of grievances are the continuously high US current ac-
count deficit, and the unsatisfying growth performance of the euro zone, 
especially in the large member states. The European Union has not yet 
taken full advantage of the one market – one currency opportunity. The 
European single market offers substantial benefits, but still is uncom-
pleted. The creation of union-wide regulatory frameworks for internal 
market transactions often lags behind business needs. The so-called Lis-
bon Strategy still has to be implemented.
7 Member states have become 
more serious in the pursuit of domestic reforms, however, and action 
plans for eliminating remaining barriers in the internal market are in exe-
cution.
8  
High expectations have always been set in the unified European financial 
market. In terms of size, sophistication and depth, it should offer similar 
opportunities for capital investment as the American market. Market inte-
gration is being promoted by the euro, but markets still are rather frag-
mented by different national regulations. A comprehensive action plan for 
 
7   At the Lisbon summit of March 2000, the European Council set the strategic goal 
for the EU “to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based econ-
omy in the world capable of sustainable growth with more and better jobs and 
greater social coherence” in 2010. European Council, Lisbon, March 24, 2000.  
Conclusions of the Presidency.  
8   See also: Barbara Böttcher, Klaus Günther Deutsch, Elke Thiel, Growth and Pros-
perity in Europe – An Agenda. Deutsche Bank Research, EU-Monitor, No. 8, 
January 2004. Elke Thiel 
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financial services, including time schedules, has been set up to modernize 
and improve regulatory framework conditions for private transactions. 
EU legislation procedures have been streamlined by the so-called Lamfa-
lussy approach with the view of accelerating decisions.   
The European financial market project is a huge and ambitious reform 
package, which only compares with the single market program of Europe 
1992. It is very relevant for the transatlantic relationship, too. Close con-
sultations on forthcoming EU directives are being pursued in the transat-
lantic Financial Market Regulatory dialogue. They shall ensure that 
European regulations will not impede US participation in the emerging 
unified European capital market. The implementation of the project may 
thus contribute to a further deepening of the transatlantic economy as 
well. 
The continuously high American current account deficit is a potential risk 
for the US, the EU and international currency system. The deficit is being 
financed by foreign capital inflows. With the attractiveness of the Ameri-
can economy, this has not been a problem in the past years. But circum-
stances could turn around on a sudden, if international investors lose con-
fidence in the dollar.  
Global Partners 
The transatlantic relationship is not confined to bilateral issues. Both, the 
United States and the European Union are global economic powers. 
About 20 percent of the world gross domestic product and 15 percent of 
world exports are originated in the European Union. The figures only 
compare with those of the United States. With the implementation of the 
internal market, the range of common policy issues has increased in the 
European Union. Many of them have a foreign dimension, such as envi-
ronmental protection, energy, technology and money laundering. Accord-
ingly, when the issues are dealt with, the European Union has to take part. 
Besides bilateral consultation and cooperation, many issues are being ad-
dressed in a multilateral framework. The EU has thus become a rather 
important counterpart for the United States in global negotiations as well.    
Without the participation of the US and the EU, key international trade 
and financial objectives would hardly be achieved. The conclusion of the 
Uruguay Round was delayed for a year, for instance, because the dispute 
on EC agricultural policy first had to be settled between the US and the Prospects for Economic Cooperation 
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EU. The Doha Round cannot be successfully concluded without approval 
of the US and the EU. Third countries or other regions are highly con-
cerned, not to risk favorable economic relations with either the US or the 
EU by becoming trapped in a regional framework with only one of the 
two. And this concern is, probably, preventing the formation of trading 
blocks more than any thing else.  
With the start of the European monetary union, the US Federal Reserve 
and the European Central Bank now are the two largest banks of issue. 
Central bank cooperation normally works silently and only surface in a 
currency crisis. This has not happened yet. But events around September 
11 have demonstrated that the European Central Bank is a very reliable 
partner for the Fed. Faced with a common challenge, both of them imme-
diately acted accordingly and averted a collapse of the financial markets 
by providing extra liquidity.  
The United States and the European Union are very different partners, 
however. The EU is not a single player, speaking with one distinguished 
voice. The foreign appearance of the EU reflects the sui generis nature of 
European Union and the delicate distribution of supranational and na-
tional competences. Henry Kissinger´s famous question “whom can I call 
in the EU?” has been formally settled with the position of the “High Rep-
resentative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy,” acting in tan-
dem with the External Relation Commissioner.  
When the Treaty on the European Constitution enters into force, the 
European Union will be represented by one distinguished personality in 
all external relations. It is certainly true that the European foreign minis-
ter will only be in the position of making commitments on the permission 
of the member states. But, unlike foreign and security policy, EU member 
states are so closely bound together in the economic field by the internal 
market, the single currency and the community method that they have to 
act in common. And this may also render it more difficult for American 
policy to seek for special relationships with some EU members in support 
of a certain issue. 
The new treaty also includes some provisions which will strengthen the 
position of the euro group in EU framework, including the possibility of a 
common representation in international financial institutions. An issue 
which may particularly concern the United States would be the creation Elke Thiel 
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of a common euro seat in the International Monetary Fund. The matter is 
especially favored by France and may receive some momentum by the 
European constitutional treaty. A common IMF representation of the 
euro-states would require a comprehensive restructuring of the overall 
IMF framework, however, including voting rights and capital shares. 
These are crucial issues which, of course, cannot be settled without 
American approval and support.    
Different Approaches 
American and European approaches to global issues not always converge. 
Political scientists have used the term “Neo-realism” for the US, in con-
trast to European “neo liberalism” in describing the difference. The Euro-
pean Union favors long-term, structural and multilateral approaches. This 
mode, of course, also better complies with the European Union’s own 
potentialities and capacities of action.  
Due to their own experiences, Europeans aim at promoting stability in 
conflict regions by means of economic cooperation and integration. 
American politicians often favor more immediate approaches and results. 
Yet both approaches may and have favorably complemented each other, 
especially in Middle and Eastern Europe and in the West Balkan. For the 
countries which have already entered the European Union this year or are 
expecting to join in the near future (Bulgaria and Rumania), the European 
Agreements and the pre-accession strategy have been a strong anchor in 
their pursuit of economic and political transition. With the Stabilization 
and Association process, the European Union is offering a similar support 
to the countries of the West Balkan.  
American politicians and observers have, sometimes, felt impatient with 
the course of the Eastern enlargement of the European Union, which they 
tend to consider too slow. With the first round of enlargement being im-
plemented, the point is being made that the new member states should 
now introduce the euro immediately, regardless of whether they perform 
with the Maastricht criteria of low inflation. The case is supported by the 
so-called Balassa-Samuelson thesis, stating that the transition economies 
may need higher inflation for catching up. Yet, the new members will 
have to give up substantial discretion of adjustment in that case. Should it 
turn out that the entrance rate of the domestic currency has been miscon-
ceived, for instance, or should internal market competition cause more Prospects for Economic Cooperation 
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problems than initially assumed, they will be more on the safe side, when 
currency realignment is still possible. Some of the new EU members have 
already joined the European exchange rate mechanism, however, and may 
introduce the euro in two years from now, provided they than qualify 
with the Maastricht criteria.  
Enlargement is a tremendous challenge for the forthcoming member 
states and the European Union too. Accession countries have to be fully 
integrated in the political framework of the EU, the internal market and, 
finally, the economic and monetary union. The issue is more complicated 
and demanding than the enlargement of NATO, notwithstanding the im-
portance of the latter. Implementing enlargement smoothly, avoiding se-
vere economic and social disruptions in the candidate countries as well as 
in the system of the EU, should thus be the preeminent concern not only 
on the part of the EU but also for the United States.   
What Europeans fear most is the unilateral mode of American trade pol-
icy. The WTO is not receiving much approval in the Congress and in the 
political parties. When US foreign policy turned away from multilateral-
ism after September 11, US trade policy was much likely to follow. The 
Bush administration indicated preference for bilateral and regional free 
trade agreement, which would give the US more leeway and leverage for 
unilateral decisions. The tendency is still there. At the current, however, 
the Doha Round testifies that US policy has not totally withdrawn from 
multilateralism.  
Emil Pain 
Neo-Traditionalism: a New Choice for 
Russia? 
This panel discussion deals with situations in the countries that are not 
members of the European Union. My Turkish colleague will speak of the 
country which for a long time is aspiring for membership in the Union 
while I’ll speak of Russia which is neither a part of European Union nor 
will be eager or able to join it in the foreseeable future. At least such 
prospect seems to be unlikely. There are many reasons for that. One of 
these reasons is the increasing gap in the basic values that the Russian 
society is guided by and the basic values followed by the European soci-
ety. 
When we look at the principal humanitarian values we observe a regress 
in Russia. Human rights, minority rights, independent media, individual 
freedoms, freedom of enterprise and value of liberalism as an ideology 
and an intellectual current in Russia are less in keeping with standards 
accepted in the EU than they used to be in early 1990s. 
After the recent Parliamentary election parties of the liberal persuasion 
for the first time in the post-Soviet period found themselves not repre-
sented in the State Duma while parties of imperialistic and chauvinistic 
persuasion greatly increased their representation. 
Many sociologists describe the present condition of the public opinion 
and mass consciousness by term “neo-traditionalism”. Its main feature 
are: nostalgic anguish for the Soviet past; dreaming about resumption of 
the bygone role of the superpower in the world; notions of the specific, 
unique path for Russia; anti-Western attitudes, xenophobia, increase of 
the Church’s influence on the political life of the country. Emil Pain 
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Traditionalism is an ideology artificially designed and imposed on the 
mass consciousness instead of notions that were established in the first 
post-Soviet years. 
In the early 1990s the extremely negative valuations of the Soviet system 
established themselves promptly. A share of respondents who agreed with 
the thesis that in result of the Communist revolution the country found 
itself on the periphery of history increased more than eightfold (from 7 to 
57%) just in single year, 1991. For a few years this idea preserved its 
dominance but by the mid-90s the negative attitude towards the Soviet 
epoch nearly evaporated from the Russian public opinion. Instead, the 
nostalgic longing for the Soviet times has begun. 
 
Fig. 1: Dynamics of attitudes towards the Soviet system, 1990-1996.
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It is curious that the very intellectuals who were the first who had ad-
vanced slogans “One cannot live this way” and “It’s high time to bring 
Russia back to the track of civilized development” were the most quick in 
rejecting their own slogans. For instance, Govorukhin, the film director 
who in the late 1980s shot the cult anti-Soviet film “One cannot live this 
way”, in the late 1990s shot the film “Voroshilovski marksman” which is 
strongly permeated with longing for the Soviet times and hostility to re-
forms in new Russia. 
 
1  Materials of sociological monitoring of 1991-2002. Sociological service Y. Levadi  
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Opposition to the period of reforms and idealization of 
the Soviet epoch 
In attempt to overcome traumatic valuations of the present the public 
opinion has turned to the past. The Soviet stereotypes began to reappear. 
This trend is particularly visible among the military. The red banner and 
the word “comrade” as the official address reappeared in the army. 
Rehabilitation of Stalin has made a swift progress. Against the back-
ground of nostalgic anguish for the USSR Stalin is perceived, first and 
foremost, as the gatherer of the empire, as a new Peter the Great. At the 
same time rehabilitation of Stalin is specific primarily for the elite strata 
of the society. As regards the mass consciousness I have to say that not 
many Russians (mere 3%) would like to live under Stalin. The greatest 
part of respondents (39%) would prefer to live under Brezhnev, another 
Communist leader whose reign is perceived as the stable but not cruel. 
Opposition to the West and idealization of the unique 
Russian path 
In the period when the critical attitude towards the Soviet past predomi-
nated in the consciousness of the elite and in mass public opinion the ma-
jority of Russians looked at the West as at the standard of movement to 
the future. In 1989 60% of respondents appraised the Western way of life 
as the ideal sample. However in the mid-90s a dismounting of this stan-
dard started and by 2000 the overwhelming majority (67% of respon-
dents) indicated that the Western model of the social arrangement did not 
fit, totally or partially, the Russian conditions and contradicted the tradi-
tional Russian ways. 
The proportion of people who share the notion that “Russia has the path 
of its own” increased over the 1990s twofold and by 2000 amounted to 
60-70% of respondents. Yet it should be added that there are only a few 
persons who have a clear idea what this “unique path” is. 
Popular “anti-Western” attitudes 
“Anti-Western” attitudes are totally the product of information engineer-
ing because it goes hand in hand with Russians’ preferences for major 
part of the Western way of life components, for the Western goods and 
services. It should be emphasized that, according to a Russian sociolo-
gist’s precise remark, confidence in the Western currency “is known to Emil Pain 
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exceed the Russians’ confidence in any other institutions including confi-
dence in the President of the Russian Federation”. Only some representa-
tives of the political elite demonstrate their stable and resilient anti-
Western attitudes. 
Opposition to ethnic minorities in Russia 
In 1989 the majority of respondents (59%) believed that “there is no rea-
son to look for enemies if the root of our troubles lies within us: we’ll live 
better if we work better”. Ten years later, in 1999 the situation changed 
radically: the overwhelming majority of respondents (65%) began to ex-
plain their problems by “enemies’ intrigues”. 
National minorities have become the principal target of xenophobia. 
Nearly 70% of ethnic Russians believe that other nations residing in Rus-
sia present a threat to its national security. Nearly two thirds of respon-
dents support the “Russia for Russians” slogan. The number of nationalis-
tic organizations based on this idea increased immensely, in tens of thou-
sand times. According to the official statistics, in 2003 there were 33 000 
members in 267 organizations. However, experts give a by far greater 
figure of nationalistic extremists. 
However, the popular ethnophobic attitudes are susceptible to fluctua-
tions. Sometimes, in periods of crises they increase, then they subdue. 
Meanwhile expressions of these feelings among elites are characterized 
by their high stability. It is precisely the group where people believe that 
the state bodies have to see to it that “non-Russians could not occupy the 
key positions in the government, in mass media, in the army and law en-
forcement bodies”. 
Liberal democratic ideology in post-Soviet Russia did influence the mass 
consciousness until the Russians preserved a hope that the liberal reforms 
would bring about positive changes. As these hopes were extinguishing 
the influence of traditionalism progressed. 
The popular disappointment with reforms, decline of production, finan-
cial crises, increased polarization of the social structure and, first of all, 
the enormous gap between those who occupy the upper levels of the so-
cial ladder and those who occupy its bottom levels, shrinking possibilities 
for upward social mobility – all these circumstances, taken together, pro-
vided for a greater then previously people’s susceptibility to notions of Neo-Traditionalism: a New Choice for Russia? 
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neo-traditionalism. The ethnic majority perceives demographic shifts 
painfully. 
 
Fig. 2: Rates of increase of the Russian Federation nations’ numbers in 
the time span between five censuses (1959-2002). 
 
The rapid increase of numbers experienced in the last 50 years by the na-
tions that are historically connected with Islam (the dotted line) and the 
steady decline of the Russian population numbers (the black line) are pre-
sented in the mass media in terms of disaster (The “demographic disas-
ter”). 
The Chechen war as the factor of xenophobia rise 
The Chechen war has made the strongest impact on rise of xenophobia. 
Initially the war caused the rapid rise of the anti-Chechen attitudes and 
then a general rise of xenophobia. 
Rise of neo-traditionalism is also connected to changes in the political 
elite of Russia. In comparison to Eltsin’s epoch share of scientists in the 
political elite decreased 2.5 times while the share of military increased 
nearly in the same proportion. It should be noted that the nostalgic long-
ing for the Soviet times, expressions of the imperial ambitions and of 
xenophobia are the strongest precisely among the military. 
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Table 1: Change of the elite’s characteristics under B. N. Eltsin and V. V. 
Putin.
2 
 
International factors of the rise of neo-traditionalism 
It is my opinion that nowadays the Western states’ attitude towards Rus-
sia is determined by the formula: stability is the principal aim and condi-
tion while one may shut one’s eyes to some violations of democracy and 
certain curtailment of civil liberties. 
Struggle against terrorism set forth as the principal task of the world 
community as a whole has brought about a weakening of liberal and de-
mocratic standards in many countries. It should be emphasized that these 
restrictions of freedoms and liberties do not at all help to increase national 
security. 
Some analysts suppose that Russia has no other way to modernization 
except through a strengthening of bureaucracy’s role. But increasing in-
tervention of authorities in court proceedings (the infamous Khodork-
ovski affair), in elections, in activities of mass media brings the only re-
sult: trust of population in all these institutions of democracy is decreas-
ing. 
Whom does the Russian society trust in? 
As of now only traditional institutions (the president in his personal capa-
bility of a ruler, the army and the church) enjoy confidence. Confidence 
in courts, political parties, NGOs and other institutions of civil society is 
extremely low. 
It is my opinion that movement towards traditionalism is just a result of 
political pendulum moves, some short-term reaction to defects of re-
forms. The Russian society has an opportunity for choice. It may either 
 
2  Krishtanovskaya Olga // Pro et Contra. 2002. № 4. 
 
The characteristics of the 
elite 
Eltsin’s elite  Putin’s elite 
Share of people who have an 
academic degree (%) 
52.5 20.9 
Share of persons from the 
president’s own district (%) 
13.2 21.3 
Share of military (%)  11.2  25.1 Neo-Traditionalism: a New Choice for Russia? 
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progress along the main route of the global modernization (sure, with pe-
culiarities of Russia taken into consideration) or to spend fruitless efforts 
for a search of its own unique way of development. 
Conclusions 
I agree with those of my colleagues who think that “contrary to the 
widely spread opinion the vector of the Russian society development is 
aimed at the direction opposite to traditionalism. The further moderniza-
tion is blocked not by the population’s mentality, not by Russian tradi-
tions but by the Russian elite which is neither ready nor capable to govern 
free people”. 
It is precisely the task of new elite formation in fulfillment of which such 
institutions as the Woodrow Wilson Center and our Association may pro-
vide assistance to Russia.  
Haldun Gülalp 
The Turkish Route to Democracy: Do-
mestic Reform via Foreign Policy 
I. 
In the last couple of years, a fortuitous conjunction of events has unexpect-
edly, or one might even say paradoxically, improved Turkey’s international 
standing. This rapid and significant improvement was both partly caused by 
Turkey’s democratic reforms for EU accession and gave a further impetus 
to them. What might appear paradoxical to some is that these reforms have 
been taking place under the Justice and Development Party government 
(with its Turkish acronym, the AK Party), which is known to have Islamist 
roots, more specifically roots in a political party that just a few years previ-
ously was ousted from power and closed down by the secularist establish-
ment of Turkey with the support of the military.   
The relevant events in chronological order (some causally connected, some 
not) were the following: Internal split and transformation in the Islamist 
political movement in Turkey, leading to the creation of the AK Party in 
the summer of 2001; September 11 (2001) attacks on the U.S.; AK Party’s 
electoral victory in November 2002, on a platform of commitment to com-
plete the political reforms demanded by the EU; the U.S. military adventure 
in Iraq, beginning in February 2003; the Turkish parliament’s rejection, in 
March 2003, of the deployment of U.S. troops on Turkish soil for the inva-
sion of Iraq; massive reform legislation by the Turkish parliament during 
2003 and 2004, including significant amendments to the constitution which 
was originally drafted by the military regime back in 1982 but amended 
here and there numerous times since then.   Haldun Gülalp 
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To sum up the significance of the sequence of these events, we may clas-
sify them into their domestic and global components:   
- On one hand, quite independent of and indeed chronologically prior to 
September 11 and the Iraq war, the Islamist political movement generated a 
reformist wing that noted the similarity in the non-democratic, top-down 
approaches of both the secularist elites of Turkey and their Islamist oppo-
nents, and rejected both in favor of a liberal and pluralistic democracy. 
Hence, already before September 11, the reformist wing of Turkey’s 
Islamists had moved from an intolerant politics of identity to a pluralist 
politics of recognizing diversity. The leaders of this wing still wanted to be 
publicly recognized as Muslims, but they were no longer Islamists.   
- On the other hand, however, fears of a “clash of civilizations” between 
Islam and the West, pumped up by some academics and policy-makers, ap-
peared to have been realized on September 11. U.S. actions in response 
only contributed to this fear and even furthered the conditions for it. Tur-
key, particularly under AK Party leadership, could play an important role in 
countering these fears and help distinguish between Muslim, Islamist, and 
terrorist.  
My thesis in this paper is that the AK Party government has skilfully read 
the international conjuncture and taken advantage of the opportunities that 
it created both for its own political future and for Turkey’s economic and 
political transformation. To use an expression that has now entered wide 
circulation, Turkey began to be valued “for what it is rather than for where 
it is.” As a result, Turkey is now poised to begin accession talks with the 
EU and awaiting a positive reply in the upcoming summit in December, as 
well as being treated as a special “democratic partner” by the U.S. It seems 
that one key issue of global security on which there is complete transatlan-
tic agreement is Turkey’s strategic importance.   
II. 
The elections of November 2002, which brought to power the former 
Islamists who had refashioned themselves as “conservative democrats,” 
came nearly two years ahead of schedule. Dispute over the passage of re-
form laws demanded by the EU had created a deadlock in the previous coa-The Turkish Route to Democracy 
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lition government, at the time constituted by “secular” political parties. 
Some liberal elements in that coalition government resigned and forced the 
scheduling of early elections. With the support of Islamists, those liberal 
elements also led the passing of the reform package, despite opposition 
from the Nationalist Action Party (NAP), which remained in the governing 
coalition. The ultranationalist NAP voted against EU reforms; but they also 
cooperated in the rescheduling of early elections and campaigned on the 
argument that the EU would reject Turkey’s bid no matter what Turks were 
prepared to do in order to “appease” the Europeans. This was a powerful 
argument, and one could say that the fear is still shared by many Turks, but 
it did not lend sufficient support to a policy of isolationism. Although con-
siderable segments of the secularist establishment in Turkey have an isola-
tionist bent, the tendency is clearly in the minority among the people in 
general.  
The isolationism comes partly from a choice made at the time of the crea-
tion of the Turkish Republic. Turkey chose to define itself as part of West-
ern civilization and cut off its ties with its Ottoman past, including its 
neighbors, most of which were former Ottoman provinces. Choosing “secu-
larism,” in particular, as the key component of Turkey’s modernization, led 
to a decades-long cultural crisis and political isolation. Neither the “West” 
nor the “Muslim world” would consider Turkey as fully one of its own. 
Too Muslim for the West; too secular for the Muslims: over time, this di-
chotomy became a source of weakness for Turkey. In the post-WWII pe-
riod, NATO membership offered Turkey an entry ticket into the Western 
club. Still, Turkey was always a second-class member, supported and pro-
tected chiefly by the head of the club, the U.S., but never warmly treated by 
the rest of the membership body. Turkey was useful to the U.S. during the 
Cold War period because of its geographical location and the size and 
strength of its army. The situation did not change much after the end of the 
Cold War. After a brief period of uncertainty following the collapse of 
communism in Eastern Europe, the Gulf War of 1991 led to a fresh lining-
up behind the U.S.   
But Turkey’s continued usefulness to the Western alliance because of its 
powerful army also meant that by Western democratic standards the Turk-Haldun Gülalp 
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ish army was unduly powerful in the nation’s domestic affairs. And therein 
lay a dilemma for the EU, in turn leaving Turkey in a quandary: The U.S. 
would push the Europeans to admit Turkey into their union; the Europeans 
would complain about the Turkish military’s domestic political role and 
keep Turkey waiting; but by maintaining a political distance and thereby 
limiting Turkey’s options, Europe would end up reinforcing Turkey’s 
status as a military outpost of the U.S.; this then would be an additional 
strike against Turkey. Nor was this all. An additional dilemma has been 
that the Europeans also found the internal strength of the Turkish army as 
an asset for their own interests, or against their fears. The army as the bas-
tion of Turkish secularism represented the best protection against any threat 
of Islamist takeover in Turkey.  
The above mentioned conjunction of events seems to have broken the vi-
cious cycle for Turkey. AK Party’s performance in power has become an 
eye-opener for the Europeans, and the new perception about Western stra-
tegic needs has solved the seemingly insoluble tension between the U.S. 
and the EU regarding Turkey. In the recent NATO summit in Istanbul, the 
French president admonished the U.S. president for yet again lecturing 
them on the virtues of admitting Turkey into the EU, but he also hastened 
to add that of course he supported Turkey’s bid so long as Turkey had met 
all the stipulated conditions.  
III. 
AK Party’s performance has been an eye-opener for the Europeans for a 
relatively simple reason. Previous governments in Turkey, used to using 
the principle of secularism as a stick with which to beat their Islamist op-
ponents, also tried to use the same weapon to threaten the Europeans and 
hold them hostage. “If,” they told the Europeans, “you don’t admit us into 
your union, the Islamic fundamentalists will take over.” This reasoning 
clearly implied that, first, there was a serious problem in Turkey and, sec-
ond, being rescued by the Europeans was its only solution. Third, the same 
reasoning also aimed to justify the perverse attitude of those Turkish lead-
ers who wished to impose on the Europeans that Turkey should be admitted 
regardless of whether or not they met the EU criteria. The position was: The Turkish Route to Democracy 
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“Take me as I am, or else...” No wonder, the Europeans were always reluc-
tant. By contrast, AK Party’s unyielding commitment to the reform project 
while in power completely reversed all three of the points implied by the 
above reasoning.  
First of all, the dreaded Islamists were now in power, and yet they did not 
seem to be all that frightening any more. The serious problem which the 
secularists used to invoke did not in the end turn out to be very serious at 
all. On the contrary, not only were the so-called “Islamists” harmless, they 
were also able and willing to promote democratic reforms more than the 
previous “secularist” governments. Indeed, AK Party’s performance dem-
onstrated the political use to which the “fundamentalist threat” had been 
put, precisely in order to block any reform. This situation both revealed and 
partly contributed to the potential resolution of another confusion in the 
European approach to Turkey. While the Europeans complained about the 
Turkish military’s treatment of the Kurds, they actually welcomed its role 
as the self-appointed guardian of Turkish secularism. It was this ambiva-
lence which the secularist establishment in Turkey always tried to manipu-
late, leading to the impasse in its relations with the EU.  
Secondly, and conversely, this ambivalence also challenged the Europeans 
to confront and question the place of religion in their own identity. The 
challenge posed by Turkey knocking at the EU door, particularly during the 
AK Party period, led many in Europe to see more clearly the centrality of 
religion in the European self-definition. Western mainstream opinion about 
the essential qualities of Muslim societies and the widespread belief that 
Islam necessarily prescribed a fundamentalist political order actually coin-
cided with only a marginal, radical current in the Muslim world. But if Tur-
key’s Muslim leaders did not constitute a threat, while they also rolled back 
the authority of the military, then clearly there was no basis for continued 
ambivalence. Therefore, there was nothing to rescue Turkey from, no need 
for European assistance in that regard.  
Thirdly, the AK Party government demonstrated the hollowness of the 
“take me as I am” argument of the previous governments. Turkey now was 
not only able to demonstrate its willingness and ability to undertake the Haldun Gülalp 
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needed reforms, but it seemed as if only the AK Party, with its openly Mus-
lim identity, was able to achieve this. This put Turkey into a situation 
where it could actually reverse roles with the EU. While previous govern-
ments called on EU assistance for rescue from the “fundamentalist threat,” 
now the AK Party-led Turkey could offer its own assistance to the EU for 
the same. Now it seemed like the EU needed Turkey more than the other 
way around.  
In other words, at one level, Turkey’s ambiguous cultural identity, de-
scribed above as having been a source of weakness for many decades, had 
now turned into a strength. In today’s multicultural world, Turkey began to 
stand out as a genuinely multifaceted and complex unity of multiple identi-
ties. But there was also another, a more concrete level at which Turkey be-
gan to be seen as an asset in a world dominated by the notion of a “clash of 
civilizations” – a notion that expressed colonial fears and fantasies more 
than it corresponded to a meaningful, analytical understanding of world 
affairs. 
Back in May 2003, soon after the beginning of the Iraq war, at a time when 
the U.S. officials publicly expressed their frustration with Turkey’s failure 
to assist the invasion and public opinion leaders in Turkey expressed their 
fear that Turkey was now left with no friends in the world, I made the fol-
lowing prediction in an op-ed article: I suggested that “Turkey’s apparent 
fall from U.S. favor may be a blessing in disguise. The momentous events 
of recent months may collectively help to resolve Turkey’s conflict be-
tween its ‘strategic alliance’ with the U.S. and its drive to join the EU.” I 
concluded the piece by pointing out that “After the U.S. military action in 
Iraq, the tables may be turning in surprising ways. As the U.S. establishes 
itself in Iraq, Turkey’s geopolitical military significance may decline. Yet 
the declared American aim of building a ‘Muslim democracy’ in Iraq will 
only enhance Turkey’s symbolic importance as a ‘role model.’ This shift in 
Turkey’s strategic role may also be reflected in a new domestic balance 
between the military and the forces pushing for reform. With careful man-
agement, Turkey may find itself drawing closer to Europe, while rebuilding 
the relationship with the U.S.” (Haldun Gülalp, “A Democratic Windfall 
for Turkey?” www.project-syndicate.org, May 2003). The AK Party gov-The Turkish Route to Democracy 
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ernment has indeed skilfully responded to the international conjuncture and 
boldly moved forward with domestic reform driven by foreign policy, 
which in turn has enhanced Turkey’s international standing and contributed 
to further achievements both domestically and abroad.  
Before identifying some of the important incidents that illustrate this ob-
servation, it must be noted that perhaps only the AK Party had the charac-
teristics required to facilitate these achievements. In other words, if Tur-
key’s present strength comes from its ability to demonstrate that “Muslim” 
and “democratic” are not contradictory terms, then the AK Party has so far 
been the only political organization that can claim to be the genuine article. 
Others have either been not Muslim enough or not democratic enough, or 
both. In other words, those parties that prided themselves on their secularist 
credentials could not convincingly claim to represent the sentiments of a 
predominantly Muslim society. Also, precisely because of their elitism and 
statism, they were less than convincingly democratic. Conversely, the 
Islamist parties of recent years, out of which the AK Party grew, could per-
haps claim with some justification that they gave voice to Muslim senti-
ments, but they always had a rather limited power base and they were no-
where high on the democratic scale either. Ironically, they also shared the 
statist political culture of the secularist establishment.  
AK Party’s “conservative democracy” aims to transcend Turkey’s elitist 
and statist secularism not by inverting it as if in a mirror image, as was the 
case with the political Islamist project of imposing a new cultural regime 
from above, but by instituting a liberal pluralism. Rejecting models im-
posed from above, it aims to accommodate the cultural identity of the Turk-
ish people in a new concept of liberal democracy. This makes Turkey a 
model of democracy for the Muslim world in a way that it has not been be-
fore. AK Party further expresses the claim that Islam does not prescribe a 
particular political model, and therefore does not need to be shed in order 
to achieve democracy. The leaders of the party have convincingly stated 
numerous times that they are out to disprove Huntington’s theory of the 
“clash of civilizations.”  Haldun Gülalp 
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IV. 
Their moral authority in this regard is illustrated by a number of incidents, 
the most striking of which is perhaps the aftermath of the recent al-Qaeda 
bombings in Istanbul. A sudden series of suicide attacks ripped through the 
city in the last days of the holy fasting month of Ramadan, in November 
2003, directed at Jewish and British targets, presumably sending 
simultaneous messages protesting the Israeli occupation of Palestine, the 
U.S.-UK occupation of Iraq, and the Turkish government’s seeming 
acquiescence in all this. Despite the initial reaction of fear coming out of 
Western capitals, expressed in the issuance of travel warnings to Istanbul 
and the consequent cancellation of numerous meetings and sports matches 
that were scheduled to take place in the following weeks, the AK Party 
government was unperturbed and went on its business of identifying and 
arresting the perpetrators with remarkable efficiency. By then the AK Party 
had spent a year in power and had already been able to marginalize radical 
elements among both the Islamists and secularists. In an op-ed article I 
wrote right after the incident, I suggested that “The current Turkish 
government is the best placed to win the war against al-Qaeda. While a 
secularist coalition, mixing apples and oranges, may have declared war 
against a broad front of Islamic tendencies, the AK Party government, with 
its moral authority among the Muslim majority in Turkey, will be able to 
isolate the violent fringe and drive it into oblivion.” (Haldun Gülalp, 
“Turkey’s 9/11” www.project-syndicate.org, December 2003). One of the 
best indicators of their success in this regard could be seen in the funerals 
of the suicide bombers themselves. According to television and newspaper 
reports, showing scenes from these gloomy ceremonies, there were only 
one or two people in attendance – usually a son or a brother, and no one 
else even from among close relatives who were staying away in shame and 
fear of association. The significance of this becomes apparent when 
compared with the massive demonstrations that suicide bombers’ funerals 
turn into, say, in Gaza.  
Other remarkable achievements of the AK Party government came in the 
early part of 2004 on two major issues that have been long-standing thorns 
in Turkey’s side and both of which have been presented as obstacles to The Turkish Route to Democracy 
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Turkey’s potential EU membership: unification of Cyprus and the question 
of Kurdish rights. In both instances, progress was made on two fronts 
simultaneously: while foreign policy was used as a leverage to weaken 
Turkey’s conservative establishment, the peaceful methods used in dealing 
with these issues resulted in weakening Turkey’s foreign adversaries. The 
outcomes contributed both to the development of Turkish democracy and 
to further gains in Turkey’s international affairs.  
Only a year before, in February 2003, with just a few months in power, the 
AK Party government had been publicly reprimanded by the head of the 
Turkish military and told that Cyprus was a sensitive national security 
matter and should never be tampered with. Using both the leverage 
provided by EU pressure on Turkey and the dominant sentiments among 
Turkish Cypriots in favor of unification, the AK Party government was 
able to turn the tables around completely and even make the Greek side 
look bad. As soon as the December 2003 parliamentary elections in the 
Turkish sector of Cyprus produced results in favor of the pro-peace parties, 
and despite opposition from conservative forces within the country, the AK 
Party government declared Turkey’s intention to restart negotiations on the 
basis of the Annan Plan that had previously been shelved. Within just a few 
months the talks were completed and a referendum took place; and while 
the Cypriot Turks voted in favor of the unification of the island, the Greeks 
voted against. Thus the Turkish side, on both the mainland and the island, 
had presented itself as the peaceful side and shaken off the stigma attached 
to it by the Greek side. With one masterful stroke, the AK Party 
government had removed from the scene the anti-peace establishment in 
Turkish Cyprus, neutralized the anti-peace forces within Turkey, gained the 
upper hand on the Cyprus issue against the Greeks, won the sympathy and 
support of the UN, the U.S., and the EU, and accomplished all this while 
consistently upholding the principles of democratic process and peaceful 
diplomacy.  
In early June of 2004, a Turkish court released from prison the four pro-
Kurdish members of the Turkish parliament after ten years behind bars. 
This event coincided with the first scheduled broadcast of a Kurdish-
language program on TRT (the state-run television channel), which sym-Haldun Gülalp 
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bolized the official recognition of that language by the Turkish govern-
ment. The coincidence of these events, both outcomes of Turkey’s drive to 
meet the EU reform criteria, pushed the PKK into a corner, which then 
made the fatal mistake of ending its cease-fire with Turkey, originally de-
clared by Ocalan when he was captured and put in prison in 1999. Again, 
the peaceful and democratic openings provided by AK Party’s policy had 
turned the tables. This time around, European leaders lined up to put pres-
sure on the released Kurdish politicians to exercise their moral authority on 
the PKK fighters, while those politicians themselves began to profess dis-
tance from PKK leadership. AK Party’s policies also effectively neutral-
ized the conservative opposition within the country. Two months after the 
release of the Kurdish politicians, newspaper reports revealed that the Na-
tionalist Action Party leadership had sent a letter to over three-hundred 
generals, complaining about AK Party’s policies regarding the Kurdish is-
sue and inviting the generals to action. The same reports also added that the 
letters were collectively returned to the sender. 
While the AK Party is trying to impress upon the West the notion that Is-
lam is compatible with democracy, it is also impressing upon the Muslim 
world that democracy is compatible with Islam. Again, only the AK Party, 
with the credible Muslim credentials of its leadership, could do this con-
vincingly. Among numerous examples, one could cite a recent incident that 
was considered to be a major accomplishment by the Turkish government 
itself. In the June 2004 meeting of the Islamic Conference Organization, 
which took place in Istanbul, Turkey put forward a Turkish academic as a 
candidate for the position of the General Secretary of the Organization. Af-
ter several rounds of fruitless negotiations among the delegates of member 
countries, the Turkish foreign minister insisted that the competing candi-
dates be put to a vote. The Turkish candidate won and this was celebrated 
as a double victory by Turkey: for the first time in the Organization’s his-
tory the General Secretary was elected through a democratic process of 
open competition and voting.  The Turkish Route to Democracy 
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V. 
Turkey’s growth in international stature is not limited to the West, as as-
serted by some domestic opponents who describe the AK Party as a lackey 
of Western imperialists, doing their dirty work. Turkey has incredibly im-
proved its relations with almost all of its neighbors, possibly for the first 
time in republican history. Particularly in the Arab world Turkey is now 
seen as a good friend, whose improved standing in the West is welcomed 
rather than resented. Only five years ago, in 1999, Turkey was on the verge 
of a military confrontation with Syria, because the Syrian government was 
harboring Ocalan. Today the two neighbors are on very good terms, with 
Syria expressing support for Turkey’s EU membership because it would 
also benefit them. If Turkey proves the “clash of civilizations” to be the 
myth that it is, then surely it would benefit those that are likely to receive 
the Western wrath originating from this myth. If, on the other hand, Turkey 
is to be credible as a “role model,” then its improved relations with the 
Arab neighbors ought not to be resented by Turkey’s non-Muslim and non-
Arab friends, including Israel. Turkey’s growth in stature in the region and 
in the world has therefore also led to a significant measure of independence 
in its approach to Israel. The AK Party government has been the first Turk-
ish government in recent memory to feel free in criticizing Israel’s policies. 
This has brought the Turkish government closer to the EU position on the 
matter, further increased its prestige in the Arab world where most gov-
ernments are more reluctant to speak up about Israel, and, not least impor-
tantly, it has also more closely expressed the dominant sentiments within 
Turkey itself.  
The upcoming EU summit in December 2004 will be a make-or-break 
point for Turkey’s future. Fully aware of this situation, and having staked 
its own political future on starting membership negotiations with the EU, 
the AK Party leadership is sending messages of concern to the Europeans. 
Because “we do not have a Plan B, other than EU accession” they point 
out, the alternatives are unthinkable. This time, unlike before, it is not an 
empty threat to gain undeserved advantage: instability in Turkey would 
throw a broader part of the world into chaos.  
Michael Werz 
Back to the Future? Remarks on the 
Next Generation of Transatlantic         
Relations
* 
Much of the debate on transatlantic relations in crisis is expressed in cate-
gories of differing values or the diverging cultures on opposite sides of 
the Atlantic. Many of these attempts however, are burdened by the im-
possible task grasping very dynamic and complex developments by ap-
plying quite static concepts. Rather, the current transformation in Ger-
many should be more strongly theorized. Culturalizing categories, as well 
as much of the data produced by the numerous polls dealing with the is-
sue, must not only be contextualized but also carefully interpreted. 
In a recent poll by the Pew Global Attitudes Project for example, it was 
said that less than 15% of Germans thinks that life in the U.S. would be 
better than at home (16% said that live in the U.S. was worse, 58% said 
neither). At first it seems sensible to take this result as yet another indica-
tor of increasing distance between the two societies. Although there 
might be a fair (or unfair) amount of resentment on the German side, 
there is another interpretation that makes sense, especially with regard to 
the younger generation: Given the high degree of common experiences in 
German and American society, one could also argue that the low figure 
proves how thoroughly and successfully German society has been West-
ernized during the past forty years. This might be true, even though recent 
signs emanating from German society and the government’s foreign pol-
icy seem to be quite confusing. After the attacks of September 11, 2001, 
it took only a very short time to replace the equally massive and well 
meaning demonstrations at the Brandenburg Gate and chancellor Schroe-
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der’s declaration of “unconditional solidarity” with an atmosphere of 
widespread ambivalence towards U.S. policies and America in general. 
However, one will not succeed in explaining these contradictory devel-
opments in terms of an alleged clash of political cultures in the transatlan-
tic realm. 
The contradictions reach much deeper into the fabric of contemporary 
German society, in which the icon of “America” is a convenient distort-
ing mirror of domestic developments. However, this constellation repre-
sents a moment of truth as well, namely that the era of intuitive political 
parallelism of the Atlantic realm is over, and the mathematical method of 
quantifying nuclear warheads and calculating the width of the Fulda gap 
are far from sufficient to reconstruct a stable union of Western societies 
in the 21
st century. 
From a U.S. or Eastern European perspective it may be obvious, that 
things thoroughly changed after 1990; and one would think, this should 
be clear in Germany. But one can still get the impression that in German 
society, which was the very focus of the block confrontation for over 
forty years, this insight has somehow not settled. There is surprising wel-
fare state nostalgia when it comes to policies of robust intervention. Insti-
tutional solutions are much preferred to policies based upon a notion of 
democratic self-determination or even national interests when it comes to 
international conflicts. Finally although fading, there is still a strong atti-
tude of the same “resolute neutrality” that Hannah Arendt observed dur-
ing her first visit to the country in 1950, when she had the impression, 
that people thought that “partisanship in a conflict would be as absurd as 
partisanship during an earthquake.”
1  
For these reasons, changing attitudes and widespread insecurity about 
Germany’s role in world politics of the early 21
st century have to be un-
derstood with regard to the fact that many convictions, thought to be rock 
solid for over two generations have been shattered. The recent insight that 
the world has dramatically changed is part and parcel of the complex re-
orientations within German (and other European) societies. Therefore, 
foreign policy issues are often played out and thematized within the con-
tested field of national traditions, and further complicated within the con-
text of European integration and the unification of the two German states. 
 
1  Hannah Arendt, “Besuch in Deutschland 1950“, Zur Zeit, Munich 1989, 45. Back to the Future? 
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The impact of such a multilayered process can hardly be underestimated, 
and the reorientation of Germany’s foreign policy after the terrorist at-
tacks in the United States has to be understood within this unique histori-
cal setup. In other words, 9/11 cannot be adequately grasped without 
11/9: November 9, 1989, when the Berlin wall collapsed and two very 
different societies were united. Yet, 1989 was not appreciated as a victory 
of freedom over an corrupted ideal of literal equality in the form of West-
German expansion. But the term re-unification, suggesting that some-
thing that belonged together finally had become one, already revoked the 
past as the main resource of what historian Dan Diner has fittingly de-
scribed as an “act of creation ex negativo” (“negativer Gründungsakt”).
2 
It is in this environment that the contradictory reactions, soon to be felt 
within the foreign policy establishment, the government, and society at 
large after 9/11 are interconnected with the conflicting views of what the 
new Germany has become. 
The fact that the unification of two very different societies has been auda-
ciously and blindly termed re-unification is partly responsible for the illu-
sion that after West-Germany’s enlargement everything continued to be 
the same as before – only on a larger scale. Combined with a steady 
rhetoric of continuity, also embodied in the persona of the ever growing 
chancellor Helmut Kohl and his long lasting reign, an artificial prolonga-
tion of the old Bundesrepublik’s traditions took place. Its success story 
was closely related to the fact that West-Germans had their own state but 
never understood it as a nation. 
Since the early 1970’s very few national symbols were visible in the pub-
lic sphere, foreign policy was not based upon a notion of national inter-
ests, but mainly determined economically or socially, and the security of 
the Bundesrepublik was provided by the Army and US taxpayers. There-
fore, many of the difficult questions just did not appear on the radar 
screen during the idyllic years of economic prosperity and nuclear equi-
librium of the superpowers. Not many people will realize that the Cold 
War was a rather tranquil and comfortable time for Germany, and that it 
found itself in the center of world politics without needing to seriously 
participate. This atmosphere of prosperous stagnation facilitated democ-
ratic self-stabilization of post-Nazi society with a little help from some 
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friends like James Dean, Elvis Presley, and the 1968 student’s movement, 
as well as producing a mentality of being above (or besides) dirty world 
politics which carried on the tradition of “resolute neutrality” even after 
the active protagonists of WWII were beginning to die out. 
Yet another postwar tradition was revived under very different circum-
stances when the attacks of September 11 irrevocably ended the illusion 
that a Bundesrepublikan mentality, utterly uninterested in becoming a 
modern and democratic German nation, could go on much longer. One 
has to take into account that denial of reality and past have been impor-
tant features of German society ever since 1945, and it is no surprise that 
in the land of the Wirtschaftswunder, the economic miracle, the “primary 
moral category of the immediate postwar period was one that can exist 
independent of memory-work.“
3 Here lies the history of widespread mor-
alizing attitudes in Germany which often are applied to explain political 
realities in pre-political, bipolar, and often pacifist ways. Chancellor 
Schroeder’s pretension of defending morality against power politics in his 
confrontation with the U.S. administration is a last remnant of these tradi-
tions, as is the pride in backwardness expressed on T-Shirts worn by 
young Germans at anti-war demonstrations that read: “We are the old 
Europe”. 
This dangerous pleasure of collective inward orientation causes major 
phantom pain, which one could feel this past August when a summer 
long, bizarre debate of whether to reverse the recent reform of German 
orthography was ousted by major unrest in eastern Germany. Here, sig-
nificant parts of the population are unwilling to accept necessary social 
and welfare reductions and often resort to voting for radical parties at the 
fringes of the political spectrum. When asked if they identified with the 
democratic regime in Germany, less than half the Easterners said they 
did. Fifteen years since the wall came down, and with 1,560 billion USD 
transferred from West to East since unification, many of the 17 million 
East Germans have not yet arrived in the West. 
This tremendous internal divide further contributes to an atmosphere of 
ambivalence in which people on all sides of the political spectrum are 
idealizing the stability of the 1970’s, when Germany was divided. It was 
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a time when the world was still in order and clearly arranged, and when 
powerful political leaders could meet as Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald 
Reagan did, make peace, and make the world a better place. 
This untimely nostalgia, resulting in bewildering unrest, is itself the ex-
pression of a new consciousness, albeit expressed in categories of the 
past. In this regard, Germany is not an exception, yet it allows for com-
plex insights into a major transformation that is currently occurring in 
Europe at large. The fact that basic foreign policy issues are suddenly 
caught in the process of reassessing European and German political tradi-
tions proves that “America” is still the global standard for national self-
definition. This is even true for some of the most old-fashioned politi-
cians such as long time social-democratic mentor Erhard Eppler who re-
cently called the “No” to the Iraq-invasion a “European declaration of 
independence”. 
As a result, the current ambivalence towards the United States should not 
be misunderstood as a simple prolongation or revival of the old fashioned 
anti-Americanism of the 1920’s. After all, German society was an inte-
gral part of the Atlantic revolution in its postwar years, and it underwent a 
thorough American style modernization process, which included the crea-
tion of a new, educated middle class which does not want to be seen as 
anti-modern or reactionary. It is an illusion that the old elites, especially 
the conservatives and their pro-NATO slogan of the “devotedness to the 
alliance”, represented real Atlantic cohesion. Rather, it is an irony of his-
tory that the crisis came into being under the most pro-American gov-
ernment in postwar Germany. After all, the red-green coalition and chan-
cellor Schroeder risked a narrow vote of confidence in parliament to be 
able to send substantial numbers of troops to Afghanistan, before things 
began to fall apart. 
When the ideologically charged political categories of East and West lost 
their political use value with the collapse of Eastern regimes, there was an 
instinctual rush towards reliable institutional forms. Since the Bundesre-
publik was mainly a society for itself, it related to the world within the 
fixed organizational framework of EEC, OECD, WTO, and later NATO 
and the EU. These institutions were not external to West-German society 
but it could only develop and become a modern nation within such com-
plex frameworks. Only in the mid-1980’s did the German question be-Michael Werz 
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come visible again, although not in the political realm. It was the infa-
mous Historikerstreit, a major confrontation of historians, public intellec-
tuals and journalists about how to relate to the national socialist past 
which first expressed this occurrence; a few years later the debate was 
renewed when Daniel Goldhagen's book on Hitler’s Willing Executioners 
sold a million copies in Germany.
4 
Now that the debate has reached and impacted the policy making com-
munity, the question of how to define the national interest, poses a num-
ber of problems.
5 On top of the present complications, many European 
countries are still struggling with a tradition of a pre-democratic under-
standing of national interest, which is defined as a given, emanating from 
territoriality and shaped to a large extent by absolutism and the imperial 
rivalries of the late 18
th century. National interests were basically oriented 
towards securing a viable equilibrium of power and influence. This logic 
of a zero-sum-game remained largely intact even after the French Revolu-
tion when the European nations began to conduct their respective foreign 
policies. 
In the United States the history was, of course, very different, since na-
tional interests were formed and codified by a democratic debate and es-
tablished through majority decisions in Congress that could be changed 
and reversed depending upon the political situation. In Europe (and Ger-
many) both notions of national interest are currently competing. In the 
post-absolutist age ethnic identifications have often replaced the logic of 
national interests born out of territoriality and preserved through pre-
democratic practices – which is where the main antagonism vis-à-vis the 
United States is located, since in times of crisis in Europe the ghosts of 
ethnic identifications are easily evoked.
6 
The paradoxical situation is that the United States and Germany are closer 
together now than ever before, but because of the presence of so many 
untimely attitudes in Germany, this closeness has been almost entirely 
obscured. These attitudes also neutralized many of the present discussions 
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about how to “fix” transatlantic relations, but with developments within 
Germany overshadowing the foreign policy debates, transatlantic rela-
tions cannot be fixed, since they have not been ‘broken’, but catapulted 
into the new century with many of their ageing actors overwhelmed. 
Every piece of recent foreign policy discussion was conceived within that 
burdened context and implicitly dealt with the frictions of society. Often 
times the problem is not at all about Iraq, the United States, the Security 
Council, or the new world order, but with the question of defining na-
tional interests in a reluctant nation, and what it means to speak in the 
first person plural and say “we Germans” at the beginning of a new era. 
All of which makes it so difficult to overcome German welfare nostalgia 
and the tradition of resolute neutrality in the reality of international poli-
tics. 
The only practical solution is the democratic establishment of what the 
national interests of the new Germany are meant to encompass, how they 
can be formulated in a democratic process, as well as be kept open for 
change by majority decisions. Such an achievement will only be possible 
if foreign policy debates are freed from the domestic layers that distort 
them, only then may reasonable responses to major political challenges be 
expected. However, one has to admit that the external factors in recent 
months did not favor such progress. Clearly the German government 
acted in a regrettable way, entirely lacking compensatory prudence for its 
political and military inferiority when it had to make a decision on how to 
deal with the U.S. invasion. However, external factors conveniently com-
bined to maintain the inward orientation, since the war in Iraq lacks the 
absolute necessity that qualifies the fight against terrorism. 
Nevertheless, the current situation provides certain opportunities. With 
U.S. and German interests for the first time openly at odds, there is 
mounting pressure within the latter society to come up with better argu-
ments and long term strategies for its own foreign policy priorities. Two 
institutions can be used to achieve this goal: the European Union with its 
slowly increasing military capability, and a more politicized NATO. It is 
too simple to argue that everything boils down to military strength, but 
the political dimension of spending money and energies for democrati-
cally controlled armies which are not merely defensive organizations, but 
global players in an unorderly world, has steadily grown since 1989. Michael Werz 
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Julianne Smith, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in 
Washington recently argued the same point in an op-ed when she wrote 
that “Europe risks military irrelevance in the coming decade” if political 
leaders and society at large do not realize to what an extent the world has 
changed since the end of the static defense requirements of the Cold War 
period and how complex Europe’s responsibilities in this field have be-
come. “NATO is therefore at a watershed”, Smith continues, “either it 
finds ways to develop an integrated force or it faces military unimpor-
tance in the 21st century.”
7 Exactly these dimensions, which one may like 
or not, constitute the very core of the transatlantic alliance’s future. In 
Germany, such difficult decisions cannot be postponed much longer, nor 
can the answer to the question of the legal and institutional bases of fu-
ture military and non-military interventions. 
The necessary reconstruction of the West reaches beyond shallow ques-
tions of current Foreign Policy, but it is a crucial enterprise of the near 
future. It will not be about suggested cultural differences but about 
whether a new transatlantic generation is willing to face the challenge. 
The time of automatic first downs is over. The reconstruction of the West, 
not in territorial terms but as a political entity, will require an unprece-
dented conscious effort, real dedication, and a consideration to what the 
German, and other European societies will be standing for in the next 
thirty or forty years. After having dominated the world during the last 
half millennium, mostly for the worse, envisioning the European Union 
and the Atlantic alliance as an old style, overweight balancing system is 
just not ambitious enough. 
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Pierre Hassner 
Beyond Iraq: the Transatlantic Crisis in 
Perspective
1 
Are we right to speak of a transatlantic crisis? This paper, like this con-
ference, answers this question positively. But we should be aware that 
this answer is not self-evident. For some, the increasing integration of 
Western economies and the common fight against terrorism are more im-
portant than the political differences which surfaced so explosively at the 
beginning of 2003 around the American decision to occupy Iraq. NATO 
itself, in this view, has once more weathered the storm, as shown by its 
enlargement and by its presence in Afghanistan. For others, the very no-
tion of a transatlantic crisis is, on the contrary, much too optimistic. The 
transatlantic relation, for them, has lost both its centrality and its specific 
character with the end of the cold war. Different Western countries have 
both convergent and divergent values and interests with each other as 
well as with the rest of the world. In particular between the United States 
and Europe the trend is for divergences of views, priorities, and policies 
to be more and more acute. According to some, they may lead to two an-
tagonistic blocks. 
This paper argues that the West is indeed broken, to use David Calleo’s
2 
expression, but not beyond  fixing, that the central importance of America 
and Europe for each other has not disappeared and may well re-emerge 
spectacularly in front of new challenges, but that it is unlikely to lead to 
the harmonious cooperation of two coherent entities, under a twin pillars 
structure, as envisaged in Kennedy’s grand design. Rather, a recovered 
 
1   This paper is making ample use of ideas and formulations borrowed from two ear-
lier presentations. “The West: how many divisions” at the University of Bologna, 
to appear in conference proceedings edited by Prof. T. Bonazzi and “European  
Perceptions of the United States,” Aspen Institute, Congressional Program, US-
Russia-Europe, Cooperative Efforts, Venice, August 21-27; 2004. 
2   David Calleo, “The Broken West,” Survival, Summer 2004. Pierre Hassner 
  96   
unity of the West can only be based on an awareness of intra-American 
and intra-European and transnational or transcontinental divisions and of 
common external or universal challenges. The French writer Antoine de 
Saint-Exupery used to say: “To love each other does not mean looking at 
each other but looking together in the same direction.” 
Indeed, one useful framework for interpreting and, possibly, mitigating or 
overcoming the transatlantic crisis, consists at seeing it as part of a set of 
a least six simultaneous and interdependent crises. 
1. The crisis of Atlantic institutions, in particular of NATO. 
2. The crisis of the transatlantic relationship itself. 
3. The international crisis of the United States. 
4. The internal crisis of European unity. 
5. The crisis of relations between “the West and the rest.” 
6. The crisis of relations between modernity (i.e. globalization, rationali-
zation, mobility, etc) and traditional, religious, national and ethnic identi-
ties and solidarities. 
We shall not attempt to analyze each of them, but they will inspire the 
progression of our discussions from the transatlantic crisis proper through 
the internal divisions of the United States and of Europe, to the transna-
tional and global divisions and challenges. 
I. The Atlantic crisis: political division between the 
United States and Europe 
There have been many crises within the Atlantic alliance: over the Middle 
East (at the time of Suez (1956) and of the oil embargo (1973), over 
European defense, at the time of the failed attempt to build a European 
Defense Community(1954), over de Gaulle’s abandonment of NATO 
(1966) over Germany’s Ostpolitik, the basing of Pershing and Cruise 
missiles, the new Cold War and Reagan’s “Star Wars” project in the 
1980s etc. 
None of those, however, reached the intensity and the gravity of the 2003 
crisis. This was the culmination of a crescendo of events going from the 
election of George Bush, through the reactions to the terrorist act of Sep-
tember 11, 2001, to the quarrel over the Security Council resolutions Beyond Iraq: The Transatlantic Crisis in Perspective 
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about Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction and finally the 
launching of the war on Iraq. 
Robert Kagan has written that Americans and Europeans live in two dif-
ferent worlds, the world of Hobbes and the world of Kant, that “Ameri-
cans are from Mars and Europeans from Venus.”
3 His essay had great 
resonance in Europe. Dominique de Villepin echoed it, perhaps uncon-
ciously, by entitling the collection of his speeches: “Another World,”
4 
meaning a world ruled by law instead of arbitrary force. Both were wrong 
in general: force is not alien to Europeans and the rule of law, nationally 
and internationally, is an American idea even more than a European one. 
But both had a moment of truth at least in the perceptions of Europeans 
and Americans, at the time of the launching and the initial phase of the 
war against Iraq. 
In 2002, a comparative opinion poll taken by the German Marshall Fund 
and the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations showed that the views of 
Americans and Europeans were fairly close as far as international rela-
tions were concerned: both sides saw international terrorism as a most 
dangerous enemy, both (with bigger majorities in the United States) 
thought that the use of force might be legitimate but both (with a bigger 
majority in Europe) thought it needed a multilateral sanction, of the UN 
or at least of the Western Alliance, to be legitimate. A year later, in 2003, 
the same poll indicated that both sides overwhelmingly (83% in the U.S., 
79% in Europe) thought that they had different values.
5 
What had happened in between was the launching of the war, preceded by 
two years of declared and active American contempt for multilateral insti-
tutions provoked, as seen from the American side, by the repeated failure 
of these multilateral institutions themselves. 
While Americans and Europeans were united in the struggle against ter-
rorism and in the war against Al Quaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, 
only the American public believed by a large majority in the arguments 
for the war in Iraq: weapons of mass destruction, links between Bin 
Laden and Saddam Hussein and involvement of the latter in 9/11, regime 
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- change leading to the democratization of the Middle East and to in-
creased chances of settling Arab-Israeli conflict. The European public, 
even in countries whose governments joined the war out of loyalty to the 
United States and in the hope of influencing it, was not only less eager for 
retaliation and less willing to take risks but more sceptical of official an-
nouncements and intelligence reports and above all more mindful of Mus-
lim reactions and of the ultimate political failure of past military victories 
from Algeria to Vietnam. 
At the outset of the war, there were solid American and European majori-
ties in the two opposite directions – for and against.
6 This led to the blur-
ring not only of intra-European differences but also of European percep-
tions of American differences. From the triumphant unilateralism of the 
Bush administration to the fate of prisoners in Guantanamo or Abu 
Ghraib, a negative image of America was gathering more and more force 
(e.g. favorable opinions dropped in one year from 63% to 31% in France, 
from 70% to 34% in Italy, from 79% to 50% in Poland) just as the vision 
of Europe as ungrateful and cowardly was spreading in the United States. 
Some thinkers like Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida, basing them-
selves on the huge pacifist demonstrations which covered all Europe in 
the spring of 2003 and some political scientists, like Dominique Reynié
7 
have announced the birth of a European consciousness and public opin-
ion. 
This stark opposition has begun to recede, however, with the turn taken 
by events in Iraq. The changes in American policies went in the direction 
of European warnings about occupation and wishes for an early transfer 
of sovereignty to the Iraqis. American public opinion started turning 
against the war: at this writing, a majority of Americans thinks that the 
war was not worth the casualties it caused, and that it increased the terror-
ist danger rather than reducing it. There is, then, as before the war, only a 
difference of degree between American and European opinion. At the 
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very least, while European opinion remains united in its opposition, 
American opinion is now deeply divided. On the other hand, the congres-
sional investigations and the Supreme Court’s decisions about the rights 
of “enemy combatants” to challenge their situation in court, is doing 
much  to reestablish European confidence in the United States as a coun-
try where “checks and balances” and “due process of law” have not lost 
their relevance. 
Can one, then, speak of a passing divergence of views and of a return to 
mutual understanding and cooperation? This would be much too optimis-
tic. To begin with, concerning the Iraq war itself, further developments 
(whether in the direction of a precipitate American withdrawal or of a 
spreading of hostilities to other countries, above all to Iran, may reopen 
recent wounds. At any rate, while the German government is working 
towards a reconciliation with the United States, and its successor is likely 
to do so even more, the precipitous and unprecedented decline in positive 
feelings towards the United States in German public opinion (from 60% 
favorable to 25%), and the concomitant rise in the priority of the Euro-
pean connexion over the Atlantic one (81% against 9%),
8 represent a real 
sea-change, and are not likely to disappear soon. 
However, Americans have no reason to fear a Europe directed against 
them as the rhetoric of some fractions, particularly in France, would seem 
to suggest. While anti-American feelings progress, they translate more in 
a vague pacifism or a vague aspiration to Europe being its own master 
than in any coherent policy. The impulsion for a “superpower Europe” 
could only come from active cooperation between France, Germany and 
Britain, but France, while popular throughout the world for standing up to 
the United States on Iraq, is increasingly isolated diplomatically in 
Europe, as illustrated by the composition of the new European Commis-
sion. Britain, while likely to be less unconditionally pro-American than 
Tony Blair, is not likely to become wholeheartedly in favour of a power-
ful Europe, let alone one hostile to the United States and Germany for 
both economic, psychological and ideological reasons, is not about to 
make the sacrifices and run the risks involved in trying to create a Euro-
pean superpower. But partly for the same reasons, the United States, even 
if it returns to a more multilateral and pro-European stance, has no great 
 
8   Transatlantic Trends 2003, summary, p. 7 Pierre Hassner 
  100   
reason to hope for an active and dynamic European help in maintaining 
stability, let alone democracy in Iraq or even in Afghanistan, where the 
performance of the European members of NATO has so far been even 
more unsatisfactory than the American one. If John Kerry wins the 
American presidential election, he may be depriving the Europeans of an 
alibi: that of Bush’s uncooperative stance. Europeans seem not to have 
the energy either to really oppose or to really support the United States. 
One is almost tempted to think that Robert Kagan was more than half-
wrong about Americans but more than half-right about Europeans. 
In 2002, the Bulgarian scholar Ivan Krastev had formulated the difference 
between Americans and Europeans in the following terms: “The Ameri-
cans feel they are in a war, the Europeans feel they want to prevent one.” 
I had answered that this was true but that one had to distinguish between 
different kinds of wars : we are all at war with Al Quaida and Islamic 
fundamentalism since they are at war with us; but we have to do our best 
to prevent this war from turning into a clash of civilizations, or a war of 
the West against the rest, and in particular against Islam. Today, this dis-
tinction still seems valid but I must confess that on the one hand Kagan 
was closer to truth than I thought, at least concerning the unwillingness of 
some Europeans to contemplate war under any circumstance at all, and on 
the other hand the clash of civilizations, which remains a wrong and dan-
gerous idea, has made enormous progress, in great part because of the 
Iraq war and American policies which have gravely spread and aggra-
vated anti-Western feelings in the whole Muslim world. 
It is, then, the Europeans, turn to fear that particularly in the Middle East 
where both sides of the Atlantic have the same interests and, at least in 
principle, the same policies, America’s lack of engagement or tacit en-
gagement in the wrong direction will have catastrophic consequences for 
all. 
Other differences, while still ambiguous, are more structural or based on 
objective differences of interest or inevitable differences of priorities. 
Everybody can see that the disappearance of the Soviet Union greatly di-
minished the mutual security need between America and Europe, and that 
the rise of Asia diminishes the comparative importance of the latter for 
the former or that the European demographic decline and the growth of 
Maghreb’s population and immigration to Europe create specific prob-Beyond Iraq: The Transatlantic Crisis in Perspective 
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lems which are bound to affect its foreign policies more than those of the 
United States. 
The differences in power, while obvious, are more debatable. America’s 
economic growth, while spectacular, may be fragile. Western Europe’s 
comparative stagnation may hide its real strength.  
Militarily and technologically, America’s huge and growing superiority 
may prove to be a double-edged sword by creating the temptation to use 
military power against states when other methods and other targets should 
be given priority. An imperial policy based on military force, even if jus-
tified, may require a return to conscription and higher taxes, with un-
wanted social and political consequences. 
But all this being said, America’s ability to project and use force will re-
main greatly superior to Europe’s for the foreseeable future and this will 
create practical problems of perception and cooperation even if each side 
abandons the illusion of going it alone. The most controversial dimension 
is that of differences in values and social trends. For Kagan, values and 
attitudes separate Europeans from Americans while their interests, well 
understood, would be to accept the benevolent hegemony of the United 
States and thereby a consolidate its legitimacy. For Charles Kupchan, 
both values and interests are increasingly divergent across the Atlantic 
and will lead to the real clash of civilizations, between America and 
Europe.
9 For Michael Lind, the values and societies are increasingly con-
verging but geopolitical interests are increasingly divergent.
10 For Philip 
Gordon (with Jeremy Shapiro)
11 and Timothy Garton-Ash,
12 while priori-
ties differ, both values and interests, are more common or compatible 
than opposed, transatlantic conflicts are due to mismanagement more than 
to structures, a new deal or a new grand bargain (around Iraq for Gordon, 
after November and around a comprehensive agenda leaving Iraq aside 
for Garton-Ash) are both possible and imperative. 
 
9   Charles Kupchan, The End of the American Era, Knopf, 2002. 
10 Michael Lind, The Atlantic is becoming even wider”, The Financial Times, 23 
August 2004. 
11 Philip Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, Allies at War, Brookings, 2004, and Philip 
Gordon, “Letter to Europe,” Prospect, August 2004. 
12 Timothy Garton-Ash, Free World, Why a crisis of the West reveals the opportunity 
of our time, Allen Lane, 2004, and “Letter to America”, Prospect, August 2004 Pierre Hassner 
  102   
A few points seem beyond controversy. Domestically, the United States 
has moved to the right even if economic or international circumstances 
may lead, now and then, the Democrats to victory. There are comparable 
trends in Europe, where the failures of social-democracy and the crisis of 
the welfare state produce periodic calls for reform in the Thatcher-Reagan 
direction, but the resistance is much stronger. The priority given to equal-
ity and security over competitiveness and flexibility is still alive. 
Another, perhaps even more spectacularly growing difference, is about 
religion. Europeans are becoming less religious, Americans more. Euro-
peans are the exception to the revival which seems to occur in all major 
religions, with explosive political consequences.
13 They tend, mistakenly, 
to identify American religiosity with Protestant fundamentalism, whereas 
American religion has in great part, followed the same evolution in an 
individualistic, non-dogmatic direction as in Europe.
14 But the political 
influence of conservative Protestants has no equivalent in Europe. As 
Karsten Voigt remarked, in Germany, fundamentalist Protestants are pre-
dominantly pacifists, in America they tend to be predominantly Mani-
chean. 
None of these differences is fixed and permanent, however. Many appar-
ently specific American trends are coming to Europe, from evangelical 
preachers to harsher penal sentences and to capitalist concentration in 
newspapers, in publishing and the media. 
What may justify the variety of interpretations are the internal divisions 
both within the United States and within Europe? 
II. Internal divisions and mutual perceptions 
The most politically relevant division cutting across the transatlantic di-
vide is political culture. As Gertrude Himmelfarb has observed, perhaps 
with some exaggeration, in One Nation, Two Cultures,
15 the United States 
is divided into two cultures: what she called in 1999-2000 the dominant 
culture, that of laxity in terms of family and sexual rules but of insistence 
on “the caring virtues,” on compassion, repentance for past  sins towards 
minorities etc., and what she called “the dissident” culture, calling for a 
 
13 Malise Ruthven, Fundamentalism, The search for meaning, Oxford University 
Press, 2004. 
14 Cf. Alan Wolfe, The Transformation of American Religion, Free Press, 2003. 
15 Gertrude Himmelfarb, One Nation, two Cultures, Random House, 1999 and 2000. Beyond Iraq: The Transatlantic Crisis in Perspective 
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return to the virtues of work, family, patriotism, discipline or manliness 
and for “a de-Europeanization i.e. re-moralization of American culture.” 
She called for “a change in culture through politics.” In large measure, 
this has been accomplished by the election of George W. Bush and above 
all by the shock of 9/11. But it had started earlier. The rise of this trend 
has been described and explained in various ways as the rise of the “Jack-
sonians” (W. Russell Mead)
16 as the conquest of the United States by 
Texas or by the South (Michael Lind).
17 
Many Europeans have tended to deplore what they saw as the wild 
swings in the American moods and intellectual fashions. Yesterday, 
Europeans, and particularly Parisian intellectuals, were mocking the ex-
cesses of “political correctness,” of legalism, of feminism, of self-
denigration, of risk-avoidance (like the primacy of force-protection and 
the search for a “zero-death” military posture). To-day, they criticize the 
opposite excesses – bigotry, brutality, self-righteousness, Manicheism, 
arrogance, adventurism. It does seem an American tendency for the pen-
dulum to go from one extreme to another, although some balancing 
mechanisms have preserved the United States, unlike most of Europe, 
both from the fascist and from the communist experience. 
But the point is that while some Europeans criticize the oscillations in 
American political culture, most of them criticize one version and identify 
with the other. The groups traditionally most pro-American, the youth, 
the educated, are, today, the most hostile to the Bush administration. 
Some recent American presidents like Kennedy and Clinton have been 
popular among the European young, as symbols of dynamism and mod-
ernity. Carter was respected by some for his stand on human rights, but 
irritated others by his sanctimoniousness and moralism. Nixon was at-
tacked by the left because of Vietnam and Chile, he was criticized by 
Protestant Europe for Watergate but found favor with Catholics and 
Latins more hostile to moralism and appreciative of realism. Reagan was 
criticized for his black-and-white view of the world and for his vigorous 
assertion of American primacy but criticized by the right and applauded 
by the left for his understanding with Gorbachev. Only George W. Bush  
 
16 Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence, Knopf, 2001. 
17 Michael Lind, Made in Texas. George W. Bush and the Southern Takeover of 
American Politics, Basic Books, 2003. Pierre Hassner 
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is almost unanimously condemned in Western Europe, for being both ar-
rogant and simplistic, trigger-happy and missionary. 
This quasi-unanimity is broken, however, by the attitudes of the formerly 
communist European countries.
18 American traditionalism, complete with 
patriotism, religion, family values, death penalty and repression of sexual 
minorities reassures them more than it shocks them. They are more en-
thusiastic about capitalism than about social democracy even though 
many of them are nostalgic of the stability provided by the last years of 
communism, and East Germans have remained distrustful of “American 
imperialism.” While Greece is the most anti-American country, Albani-
ans, particularly Kosovars, are the most pro-American people. And this 
brings in the second aspect, the role of the American superpower in the 
world. 
For most West Europeans, American power was necessary and beneficial 
(although occasionally misguided like in Vietnam) as long as there was a 
Soviet danger. Once the United States has remained the only military su-
perpower as well as at the center of the world economic system, the ten-
dency to resent its superiority and to fear its domination has increased 
spectacularly, as well as the temptation to blame it for all the injustices 
and disruptions of the world, whether caused by its influence or by 
broader phenomena as globalization. For the East Europeans, by contrast, 
America has remained the Liberator, the country that, by standing up to 
the Soviet Union or to Milosevic, has delivered them from evil. Most im-
portantly, it remains the power they trust for their protection against their 
former masters, and, initially at least, they were ready to give it the bene-
fit of the doubt in its search for liberating the world from other tyrannies.  
West Europeans, too, have expressed solidarity with the United States 
after 9/11 against the new common enemy, Al Quaida, witness the fa-
mous editorial in Le Monde “We are all Americans,” and the immediate 
and unanimous invocation of article 5 of the NATO treaty. But the dis-
dain with which these shows of solidarity and these offers of help were 
received by the Bush administration, the difference of intensity of the re-
action and, above all, the difference of analysis between Americans and 
Europeans of the threat and of the means to counter it, have soon soured 
 
18 Cf. Ivan Krastev, “The Anti-American Century,” Journal of Democracy 15.2, April 
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these feelings of communality and, above all, the faith of West Europeans 
in America’s leadership. While for some, on the left, the search for the 
root causes of terrorism led to seeing America as having created the situa-
tion which lead to Islamic terrorism, a vast majority of the critics insist 
that their quarrel is with the Bush administration, not with the United 
States as such, nor its past policies. For instance 76% of the French and 
68% of the Germans blame Bush rather than America. For the Russians, 
the proportion is the opposite: 29% blame Bush, 48% America.
19 Never-
theless their negative reaction to current American policies does translate, 
particularly among countries nostalgic of their past position, like France, 
or eager to show their independence, like Germany, into a more long-
range desire for Europe to ensure its own defense and security even 
though, as we have seen, this desire is not likely to lead to a real financial 
and military effort any time soon. What this shows is that Americans and 
Europeans do not live in different worlds but that their reaction to the 
same challenges may lead to divergences and disputes between them. 
Very often, however, these transatlantic divergences and disputes are an-
other face of intra-American and intra-European ones. Just as the Ameri-
can right’s outbursts against Europeans are often primarily aimed at 
American liberals, so the desire of European governments to show their 
independence from the United States is often, above all, a way of courting 
the favor of their own pacifist youth or of undercutting their leftist or na-
tionalist challengers. 
III. Common debates, different reactions  
The detour through intra-American and intra-European differences points 
towards a third dimension: the general evolution of the West, and the way 
its course is influenced, deflected or arrested in different places and at 
different points in time by encounters with external challenges. A perfect 
example is the parallel between the Suez expedition of 1956 and the Iraq 
one of 2003. In 1956 it was the French and the British who described 
Nasser as Hitler, saw in him both a menace to Western energy security 
and a decisive aid to the Algerian insurrection and, together with Israel, 
attacked him. They were stopped by whom? By the United States, in con-
vergence with the Soviet Union and in the name of the United Nations 
and of the illegitimacy of unauthorized use of force!  
 
19 Pew Research Center, Views of a changing World, 2003. Pierre Hassner 
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The French and the British were, then, in the middle of the decolonization 
struggle whereas the United States, led by a soldier’s distrust of the “mili-
tary-industrial complex” and of war in Asia, had not yet engaged in Viet-
nam, where John F. Kennedy, a dynamic young president advised by “the 
best and the brightest” civilian strategists was to plunge a few years later. 
The Vietnam adventure, in turn, produced a delegitimization of the 
American establishment. It contributed, domestically, to the counter-
culture of the 1960s, and, internationally to a reluctance towards risk-
taking and the use of military power. In turn, the neo-conservative 
movement is perhaps above all a reaction to the humiliation of Vietnam 
and to the spirit of the 1960s. They were looking for an opportunity to 
reawaken American patriotic virtues and reaffirm American military 
power. This opportunity was given by the terrorist attack of September 
11, and could be exploited thanks to the huge military power accumulated 
since Reagan and to the disappearance of the Soviet challenge. Mean-
while, the Europeans had no similar domestic reaction. Externally, while 
not going to the extremes of the American reluctance to risk the lives of 
their troops, they had assimilated the lesson of colonial wars and with the 
partial exception of the U.K. and France turned their energies – or what-
ever was left of them – to domestic and European pursuits.  
Another element is that the United States had grown gradually closer, and 
the Europeans colder, to Israel. But the point is that old challenges (the 
Arab world, oil, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the encounter of the West 
with traditional cultures, and religions) and new but common ones (glob-
alization, climate change, epidemics and, above all, apocalyptic transna-
tional terrorism) caught Europe and America at different stages of their 
evolution, both in terms of political culture and in terms of power. 
This raises fundamental questions about their cooperation. Timothy Gar-
ton-Ash is right to write: “America is divided by a great argument about 
itself. Europe is divided by a great argument about America, which is, 
however, also a symptom of Europe trying to make sense of its own 
transformation.”
20 But there is a complementary truth which is no less 
important. 
America is divided but in spite of periods of self-laceration and of excep-
tions on the extreme left and the extreme right, Americans are all certain 
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of their identity and of a traditional belief: the idea that America has a 
mission in the world and the strength to implement it. On the other hand, 
they have very little understanding of this outside world which they want 
to lead or to save. Hence their surprise at the resentment or the resistance 
they encounter. 
Europeans, on the other hand, being much less self-sufficient, are much 
more in contact with the complexities of the world. They wonder at 
American naïveté and are apt to avoid pitfalls which, in addition, they 
could much less afford than the United States. But their self-pride, their 
dynamism and their sense of the future remain at a very low level, in spite 
of the remarkable achievement of the European Union, which seems to 
have lost, at least among its members, the power of attraction and inspira-
tion it once had. 
Out of this difference can arise conflict and misunderstanding, or com-
plementarity and cooperation. If only Americans could resist their impe-
rial and utopian temptation without falling into its isolationist opposite, if 
Europeans could resist their pacifist and their “passivist” temptations (or 
preference for the status quo), their alliance could be as useful against the 
new threats as it was against the old ones. But for that, the Americans 
must learn to listen as well as to lead. They must recover the wisdom 
which once led them to favor a uniting Europe instead of trying to divide 
it. 
Americans and Europeans could then work together for a mixed and 
flexible system which would combine American primacy, a concert of 
powers sharing a minimum of common interests and values, and a real 
dialogue with other actors, state and non-state, aimed at reforming the 
world and at saving it from destruction. 
But this is a distant perspective. For the time being, the European are 
faced with the reality of the struggle between the “hyperpower” of the 
American empire and the “hyper-terrorism” of fanaticism and resentment 
have a choice between four attitudes. 
The first would be a quasi-total western solidarity as exemplified by Tony 
Blair. 
The second would be a quasi-total opposition to US imperialism as ex-
emplified by the extreme left and the “alterglobalists.” Pierre Hassner 
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The third would be a kind of passive neutralism: “Neither with the United 
States nor with Saddam (or Al Quaeda)” on the model of the Italian slo-
gan of the 1970s “neither with the state nor with the Red Brigades.”  
The fourth would be based on differentiation, discrimination and condi-
tionality. It would say yes to the war against fanatical terrorism but no to 
the war of civilizations, or of North against South, Christians, Jews and 
Hindus against Muslims, rich against poor, etc. 
It would say no to the war against Iraq, but yes to an energetic help to 
avoid post-war disaster. It would say no to the imperial utopia of univer-
sal democracy imposed by force, but it would say yes to differentiated 
efforts at fighting against tyranny and insecurity, through means which 
may or may not include force, according to criteria of legitimacy and ef-
fectiveness. It would be faithful both to Europe’s interests and to its prin-
ciples.  
Shahram Chubin  
Prospects for US-European Coopera-
tion on Terrorism and Proliferation 
Abstract 
Since the end of the Cold War, US-European threat assessments and ap-
propriate responses, have diverged  Despite similar values, in the absence 
of a common threat,, other differences have loomed larger. (Thus Robert 
Cooper in 1996 contrasted postmodern Europe: post nationalist, sharing 
sovereignty, averse to the use of force  and secular, with a ‘ modern’ US 
that is highly nationalist, jealous of sovereignty, strongly religious and 
over-reliant on the use force) 
Common institutions like NATO have not been enough to the keep the 
relationship on track. Past differences like the imbalance in power (mili-
tary effort, mil-ex) and emphasis (global vs. regional/ force vs. diplo-
macy) now appear much starker. In a unipolar world, the US has less pa-
tience with consensus and legitimation through collective bodies (or ‘war 
by committee’). And the EU, preoccupied with its own historical experi-
ment, sees itself as the model for a rules-based system of international 
order to be achieved through the stabilization of Europe through integra-
tion, enlargement and engagement. 
None of this prevents cooperation, for even in areas where there are seri-
ous differences, there are also joint interests. But such cooperation in ter-
rorism and proliferation is necessarily fragile especially after Iraq which 
reinforced the caricatures on both sides. And it is unlikely to cover the 
major schism that has developed and may grow as new threats emerge. 
However much most of  the Allies may want to draw a line under their 
differences on Iraq and move on, the future of Transatlantic relations re-
mains linked to the responses to 9/11 and Iraq. Whether (and how) the 
allies can cooperate on terrorism and WMD proliferation cannot be as-Shahram Chubin 
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sessed without reference to recent events and experiences and what they 
reflected and their legacies. What follows is a greatly simplified and ab-
breviated assessment intended to sharpen the distinctions for purposes of 
discussion. My basic thesis is that 9/11 and its aftermath has exacerbated 
other differences among the allies(burden sharing, military effort,) and 
especially different visions of world order. This differentiates it from pre-
vious and perennial alliance crises. It could thus serve as a turning point 
in an alliance that has lasted well over half a century. Europe has neither 
the cohesion nor the will to compete with the US but as an economic 
power it can obstruct a US dominated order. This need not happen but it 
may. After a brief discussion of recent events to illustrate existing differ-
ences I turn to an issue that may widen existing gaps even further: Iran’s 
nuclear weapons programme, and conclude by looking at the broader pic-
ture. 
The US and Europe after 1989 
Changes in the international system account for divergent threat percep-
tions between European and US inter alia on proliferation and terrorism. 
During the Cold War there was a sense of shared threat, a common focus 
on Europe and acknowledged dependence on US leadership. Bipolarity 
tempered US behaviour. No such shared threat existed after 1989. Un-
checked, the US found it difficult to resist the ‘unilateralist temptation.’ A 
shift in focus from Europe plus a widening of the capability gap, left the 
utility of NATO in question. While the US saw its role as the guarantor of 
international security it found its allies more prone to question its meth-
ods and less able to contribute meaningfully to solutions. The Europeans 
in turn resented the lack of consultations but were unable to generate the 
political will to increase their defence effort. 
As the US came to see itself as the peerless ‘indispensable state’ creating 
its own legitimacy, its allies focused on institutions and norms and multi-
lateralism.
1 
This was as much true of nonproliferation as intervention policy For the 
US, proliferation emerged as the primary threat after the Cold War. En-
forcement  of compliance of arms control in the form of  muscular 
counter-proliferation replaced an interest in arms control agreements. A 
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shift to “punitive and defensive options” was perceptible. In addition, 
“increasingly dire” threat assessments” depicted proliferation as “uname-
nable to deterrence or  political persuasion” creating the basis for US uni-
lateralism
2 In contrast Europeans while geographically more exposed 
were less so strategically, with corresponding less threat awareness. 
Europeans tended to look at proliferation less as an existential threat and 
more of an issue to be dealt with in terms of its “underlying causes” (such 
as security problems and grievances) and in its regional context with di-
plomacy.
3 
At the same time, in the US international terrorism had risen in salience 
as a threat to security(especially after 1993). The tendency for terrorists 
(cults, religiously motivated) to inflict maximum violence seemed to her-
ald a new era of “mass casualty” terrorism. This appeared to be proven 
when the Aum Shinriyko cult tried to use WMD in the Tokyo under-
ground in 1995. Thereafter standard discussions of terrorism in the US 
incorporated the probability of WMD terrorism. The Europeans’ ap-
proach remained resolutely conventional. Having seen -- and seen off -- 
ideological terrorism in the 1960’s and 1970’s (Red Army Faction, Red 
Brigades, BaaderMeinhoff)   ,Europeans were more impressed by the 
staying power of the  national terrorists like IRA, ETA, Action Direct and 
further afield LTTE, all of which had political agendas and needed some 
form of political response. Even the terrorism in Europe from the 
Maghreb (1990’s) or Middle East (1980’s) were seen in a similar light. 
The US perspective and logic led to certain policy conclusions. If “rogue 
states” were  undeterrable (Les Aspin) and they consorted with transna-
tional terrorists seeking WMD, who were also undeterrable, what was to 
prevent these rogue state from supplying these terrorists with WMD? 
Similarly, if both of these groups were undeterrable, policy would have to 
deal with them through counter-proliferation (later called pre-emption) 
and defence (NMD). This conflation of threats, (which the 9/11 Senate 
Intelligence Commission called, a “train of assumptions”) of course crys-
tallized in the case the US made regarding Iraq and Al Qaida post 9/11. 
 
2   Gilles Andreani Survival (1999/2000)p.43-44. Andreani quotes a 1998 poll as put-
ting international terrorism and proliferation as the most ‘critical’ threats facing 
the US.(45). 
3   Andreani, 55-57. Shahram Chubin 
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The Europeans, on the other hand, saw rogue states rather differently, 
without demonizing them and not excluding critical dialogue with them. 
Nor were they persuaded that such states would relinquish their WMD to 
terrorists and thereby subject their own security to the whims of such 
groups. For Europe diplomacy remained the primary means of dealing 
with such threats.  
These differences in approach, already evident in the 1990s, were crystal-
lized in the reactions to 9/11. 
9/11, Iraq and its Repercussions 
The surprise attack on the US homeland brought home the fact that the 
US was at war with shadowy figures from the Middle East willing to tar-
get civilians. Prior to 9/11 the US and Europe diverged on the immediacy 
and ‘criticality’ of the threat; after 9/11 they diverged on whether they 
were “at war” and whether there is such a thing as a global terrorism (as 
opposed to many terrorisms).  (The Europeans also felt less existentially 
menaced)
4 Where the US focused on the military means to deal with the 
threat from terrorism, Europeans tended to differentiate among terrorisms 
and focus on  the “root causes” animating the various terrorist movements 
(eg  Hamas, the Chechens, Kashmiris, etc). Sympathy for the US after 
9/11 initially covered this divergence but it soon emerged on Iraq. 
The US response to 9/11 was not encouraging. Besides the military em-
phasis there was the strident rhetoric (“with us or against us”), the slight-
ing of a NATO role in favour of coalitions of the willing and later the un-
disguised effort to play on European divisions. If the US emphasis on 
forward and anticipatory self-defence was generally supported, the effort 
to link Iraq with 9/11 was not. Where many in the US, chafing at the in-
ability to deal with Saddam Hussein in 1991 (or 1998), saw this as ‘unfin-
ished business’ for the international community, and another case of for-
ward defence against terrorism, most Europeans saw this as a discretion-
ary war, not necessitated by an imminent threat or indeed any security 
rationale. The US willingness to go it alone (albeit in a coalition) without 
Security Council or NATO legitimation seemed to underline for Europe-
ans the shift of the US from “status quo superpower to revolutionary hy-
 
4   While for the US post Cold war threats shifted to terrorism, the Middle East and 
N.E.Asia, for Europeans it disappeared. Thomson (218). Prospects for US-European Cooperation 
  113
perpower.”
5 It appeared to some that the foremost aim of the US in Iraq 
was to shatter the strategic status quo in the Middle East.
6 
Although polls in 2002 showed that the majority of Americans (91%) and 
Europeans (64%) shared the view that international terrorism was an “ex-
tremely important threat,” it was also clear that they diverged on details 
and that Europeans did not view proliferation as an “immediate security 
threat”.
7 They also distinguished among terrorist groupings. Furthermore 
Europeans do not believe that anti-terrorism should be the “organizing 
principle” of national strategy as does the US National Strategy docu-
ment.
8 By 2004 a large majority of people polled in the US did not feel 
the threat from terrorism was exaggerated, while in France (57%) and 
Germany (49%) many felt that the US was exaggerating the threat.
9 
Iraq had the effect in Britain and Spain, as in the US, of undermining trust 
in government and the intelligence services. Most Europeans shared the 
view of Richard Clarke that Iraq has diverted resources away from  ter-
rorism, where it had not in fact increased that threat.
10 The fact remained 
that Europe did not accept the Bush diagnosis under which all the prob-
lems of the Arab and Islamic world
11 were grouped together “under the 
heading of the ‘war against terrorism’” After 9/11, Bali and other attacks 
including Madrid; after the war in Iraq and after revelations about nuclear 
weapons programmes in North Korea and Iran, the position of most 
Europeans still differed from that of the US. Europeans still preferred to 
look at underlying causes and to political tools to manage the problem. 
 
5   Philip Stevens “A Fractured world remains a very dangerous place,” The Financial 
Times December 19, 2003, 13. 
6   “Iraq :La tromperie” (edit.) Le Monde January 27, 2004, 17.  
7   2002 Chicago Council on Foreign Relations/German Marshall Fund poll. See Da-
lia Dassa Kaye “Bound to Cooperate?” The Washington Quarterly (2003/4) 186-
188. 
8   James Steinberg “An Elective Transatlantic Partnership for the 21st Century” in 
Crossing the Atlantic (A report from the Aspen Atlantic Group 2003workshops) 
Madeleine Albright and Kurt Campbell (eds) 2004, 21. 
9   From the PEW Poll quoted in “Foreign Policy: America is from Mars, and Europe 
from Venus” The Economist March 20, 2004, 51-52. 
10 A prominent member of the European Commission summed up the conventional 
wisdom as follows: “Because of the Iraq war, the threat of terrorism is now ten 
times worse than when Saddam was in power.”  “Charlemagne: We Told You 
So” The Economist May 15th, 2004, 30. 
11 See “On Terror, We are all on the same side,” The Financial Times (edit) March 
18, 2004, 12. Shahram Chubin 
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Whether on proliferation or terrorism strong responses needed to be com-
plemented by political strategies: “Terror thrives in conditions of poverty 
and inequity, weapons programmes appeal to the dark ambitions of inse-
cure states in a hostile world.”
12 
Despite the different emphases, the Europeans sought to narrow differ-
ences with the US, and avoid the idea that they were opposed to the use 
of force under any circumstances. The EU Strategy document approved in 
December 2003 reflected a definite effort in this regard. It placed terror-
ism and WMD as high priorities in security policy; accepted the need for 
forward defence, envisaged that there might be circumstances when force 
would have to be used, even preventively, and was careful not to discuss 
what would be the agency for legitimating this or particular scenarios 
when this might occur. It also pointedly noted that there were no purely 
military threats or military solutions the document sought to lay to rest 
the notion that Europe was only an economic power or had only regional 
interests insisting that the EU is “inevitably a global player.” At the same 
time it called transatlantic ties “irreplaceable” and focused on the need for 
an “effective multilateral system.”
13 All in all the document was a distilla-
tion of the lessons of recent experience for future policy guidance and an 
attempt to bridge the gaps that had emerged and polarized the transatlan-
tic community. 
Some observers saw a new attitude in Europe toward terrorism after the 
Madrid bombings (March 2004) characterized as a “wake up call.”
14 Cer-
tainly the problem of (especially Muslim) immigrant communities and 
their possible radicalization by clerics or ideologues, has become a sensi-
 
12 “Safety first in a troubled world ; but the causes of terrorism and WMD must be 
tackled too,” The Financial Times (edit.), December 27/28, 2003, 6. Romano 
Prodi, the President of the EU Commission, observed that Europeans were united 
against terrorism, Iraq was a ‘mistake,’ and that while terrorism must be fought 
violently, root causes must be addressed, including the Palestine-Israel issue. 
Brian Knowlton “European Leaders talk of greater terror fight; Many say that war 
in Iraq is not the answer”  International Herald Tribune March 22, 2004, 3. 
13 “A Secure Europe in a Better World,” European Security Strategy, (Brussels, De-
cember 12, 2003). 
14 See Richard Bernstein “Europeans perceive a new mortal threat and seek an an-
swer,” International Herald Tribune March 15, 2004, 1; John Vinocur, “Europe is 
talking tougher against Islamic terrorism,” International Herald Tribune May, 4, 
2004, 2. Nile Gardner and John Hulsman “After Madrid: Preserving the Alliance 
against Terrorism,” The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No.1743 April 9, 
2004. Prospects for US-European Cooperation 
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tive issue since 9/11. This is especially true but not limited to countries 
with large Muslim populations: France and Spain (mainly North African), 
Germany (mainly Turkish), and Britain (mainly South Asian). But there 
is still no sign that Europe or Europeans feel that they are at war or feel 
existentially threatened. Intra-European cooperation on intelligence shar-
ing and counter-terrorism has improved over the past three years. This 
includes a common European arrest warrant, “cooperation on extradition 
and information sharing.
15 Whether the Europeans have gone far enough 
is another question. Information sharing is one thing, coordinating among 
agencies, (law enforcement and intelligence) sharing evaluations and 
changing mindsets, (as we have seen in the US reports post 9/11) is an-
other.
16 
Strains with the US over Iraq, and divergent analyses regarding the 
causes of, and remedies for, terrorism have not prevented considerable 
cooperation between Europe and the US on counter-terrorism. Indeed 
practical cooperation between intelligence agencies has survived (and 
even intensified) despite the political tensions between Washington, Paris 
and Berlin. Practical areas include measures dealing with shipping and 
containers security as well as NATO’s role in providing the Olympic 
games with security. Extradition has been difficult given differences on 
capital punishment. Airline security has been problematic as Europeans 
are concerned about the civil liberties’ implications of sharing of private 
information about passengers with a US apparently inflamed by its ‘war 
on terrorism’ Hence fears of misuse of this information, inter alia through 
racial or religious profiling etc. The EU’s “surrender” in this to the US in 
an agreement in June 2004 was depicted by Le Monde as “ putting trans-
atlantic flights under American control.”
17 Ironically the US’s behaviour 
in Guantanamo, with military tribunals and the excesses of the Patriot 
Act, have made some European countries not hitherto noted for their own 
 
15 For background see Therese Delpech, “International Terrorism and Europe,” 
Chaillot Papers, No.56, December 2002. 
16 Richard Falkenrath “Europe’s Dangerous Complacency” The Financial Times July 
7, 2004, 13. (The title reflects the author’s disquiet about Europe’s so far ineffec-
tual response) Interior Minister of the EU agreed in July 2004 on the need for im-
proved cooperation on terror. International Herald Tribune July 7, 2004, 4. 
17 See “Les vols transatlantiques sous contrôle americain,”  and the editorial “Sous 
Pavillon US.” Le Monde Juin 22, 2004.1, 2, 20. Shahram Chubin 
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civil liberties, critics of a US that has been, until recently, a model for 
most states in that regard. 
European cooperation with the US on proliferation has also improved. 
Again, despite criticism of the US’ lumping together very different re-
gimes (the “axis of evil”) and despite different diagnosis about the causes 
noted, and hence inevitably different emphases on responses, there is not 
much divergence on the implications of further proliferation of WMD for 
world order in general or the NPT in particular. If the Europeans do not 
see that the US’ adoption of a regime change policy as very effective, re-
liable or repeatable, they are concerned about the unraveling of the global 
norm against proliferation” represented by the NPT. Nor do they want the 
US to feel that it is alone in this concern and hence encourage its hard-
liners to seek further instances of “uncooperative threat reduction” on the 
Iraq model.
18 Europeans have embraced the US, Proliferation Security 
Initiative, to intercept the transfer of materials for proliferation. Britain 
has taken the lead in managing Libya’s retreat from nuclear weapons.  
An interesting case that will confront the allies in coming months is that 
of Iran. The European states in general believe that “engaging prolifera-
tors diplomatically” can be more effective than boycotting them.
19 In that 
spirit the EU has pursued a policy of conditional engagement with Iran. 
The dialogue has included the subjects of human rights, economic rela-
tions, the Middle East issue and proliferation. Revelations about Iran’s 
nuclear weapons-related activities starting in 2002, together with the cri-
sis in Iraq and the related issue of North Korea’s nuclear programme, 
raised the question of how to deal with Iran, a state still in good standing 
with the IAEA: The three principal EU states, the UK, Germany, and 
France sent their Foreign Minister’s (EU-3) to Tehran in autumn 2003. 
The aim was to find a way of convincing Iran to stop its programme 
through inducement and to thus avoid a military confrontation that might 
other wise loom between Tehran and Washington (Tel Aviv). The carrot 
was an offer by these states to guarantee Iran’s access to nuclear technol-
ogy (and to continue talks on a favourable trade agreement) in exchange 
for which Iran would adhere to the NPT’s Additional Protocol (with 
 
18 For background see Harald Muller, “Terrorism, Proliferation: European Threat 
Assessment,” Chaillot Papers No.58 (March 2003). 
19 See “Evoking the past cannot heal the rift,” (editorial) The Financial Times June 5-
6, 2004.6. Prospects for US-European Cooperation 
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tighter safeguards) and cease (or suspend) work on uranium enrichment. 
This (October 21
st) agreement has since unraveled. Iran insists that the 
IAEA’s various resolutions deploring Iran’s activities has meant that the 
EU had failed to “close the file” on Iran’s activities and that Iran was only 
obligated to suspend not permanently cease enrichment activities. It has 
signed not ratified the AP. And it has restarted work on centrifuge pro-
duction. In reserve Iran is keeping the threat to resume enrichment, not to 
ratify the AP and to withdraw from the NPT altogether. Further talks be-
tween Tehran and the EU-3 are scheduled for late July (after this paper is 
completed). It is clear that Tehran feels less concern about a US military 
response than it felt in the summer of 2003. With US forces over-
stretched, and its moral authority compromised after the Abu Ghoraib 
revelations and the credibility of its intelligence in shreds,
20 Tehran feels 
little immediate threat from the US. Indeed in this climate Iran’s ‘stand-
ing up to’ the US gains it sympathy and admiration in the region.
21 While 
the EU can offer the inducement of a trade agreement and support for 
Iran’s access to peaceful technology, it is not clear that this alone will be 
enough.
22 The alternative of EU sanctions, strong condemnation by the 
IAEA and further sanctions under the auspices of the UNSC might have 
resonance in Tehran, if it was felt to be credible. It presupposes EU unity 
and for sanctions to work, cooperation of Iran’s major trading partners 
(including Japan) and agreement among the UNSC members (including 
Russia). All of this would be needed plus the ultimate threat of more 
forceful measures. This assumes also enough provocation and /or a smok-
ing gun to catalyze such a response. Which country or set of countries 
 
20 Richard Bernstein, “Growing ever deeper; the Transatlantic divide,” International 
Herald Tribune May 14, 2004, 2. Bernstein notes that after Abu Ghoraib and Iraq, 
it will be “vastly more difficult to persuade” allies to do something in the future 
on Iran. 
21 Personal interviews, Jordan, May 2004. Ironically the states that should me most 
concerned about Iran’s WMD programmes, its neighbours, are the most silent and 
fixated on the US debacle in Iraq. 
22 The Iranians want direct access to the full fuel cycle, allegedly on the grounds of 
self-reliance and non-dependence on external sources. An additional argument is 
the discriminatory nature of recent proposals to internationalize enrichment facili-
ties and to draw a line under those who now have them and prevent others from 
doing so in the future. This is the gist of President Bush’s initiative in 2004. (A 
similar proposal has been offered by the UK) Iran’s stance has support among 
non-aligned countries like Brazil, which is also sensitive to discrimination. This 
can thus be depicted as a new north/south issue. Shahram Chubin 
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have the standing to create such a coalition? And to embark on this road 
the allies would have to accept the possibility that Iran would leave the 
NPT and continue its programme without inspections. 
It has been suggested that the EU and the US need to change roles; with 
the EU adopting tougher policies and the US a softer approach not ex-
cluding dialogue and an eventual bargain.
23 A mix of these approaches, if 
they were credible, might work, but it might not. The question then would 
be whether the EU would remain united and adopt, with the US, a com-
mon approach? Differences in the assessment of Iran’s nuclear ambitions 
might then become an obstacle. For while European countries generally 
share the US’ goal of keeping the NPT intact, they do not, like the US, 
feel that a nuclear Iran would necessarily pose a major or direct security 
threat to Europe.
24 
The Outlook 
In these circumstances what is the scope for future cooperation in these 
fields ,of terrorism and proliferation? On the face of it, both sides of At-
lantic should have learnt lessons; on the one hand that unilateralism and 
excessive reliance on the use of force can prove counterproductive and on 
the other, that force and preventive action need to complement multilater-
alism and soft power. But this is not a view shared by all. Some argue 
that precisely these issues, remain as “the heart of the problem” in the 
alliance, namely the nature of the new threats and appropriate responses, 
including the legitimacy of pre-emption, the alliance’s role beyond 
Europe and the possibilities of reform in the Middle East.
25 If that is in-
deed still the case then the events of the past three years have only under-
scored differences rather than served to narrow them. In which case, why 
is this so? 
The problem stems from two principal causes; the wide disparity in 
power and different conceptions of international order, neither of which 
are likely to change. Post Cold war the gap between US and its allies’ 
military capabilities has grown. The US does not see others making a 
 
23 Notably by Robert Einhorn, “Iran Prospects for a Common Transatlantic Agenda: 
The Iran Nuclear Issue” Briefing Paper for the Aspen Atlantic Group, The Hague, 
Netherlands, July 6-8, 2004. See also Kaye (2003/4), 189. 
24 This is the unscientific impression of the author, worth debating perhaps. Prospects for US-European Cooperation 
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comparable military effort and therefore does not accept others’ right to 
be consulted on issues for which they take little or no responsibility (i.e. 
neither sharing the risks nor the costs) Europeans by contrast seek the 
consensual and institutional decision making they are used to from the 
halcyon days of NATO. There is no indication that Europeans (other than 
the UK and France) will be willing in the foreseeable future to spend 
more on defence, or that the US will change its approach appreciably. 
However the issue is cut (reformed forces, niche capabilities, division of 
labour etc.) the issue will persist that differences in capabilities (reflecting 
different priorities and urgencies) will remain. And the US will remain 
“unilateralist when it must.” 
The second issue is differences on a desirable international order. This 
again relates to differential power. On the one had it is not in Europe’s 
interest that the US rely only on itself. On the other hand, the US has de-
fined its role as that of preventing the “emergence of a peer competitor.” 
Some in Europe believe that the US’s aim of unchallenged supremacy is 
incompatible with “Europe’s aim of becoming a political actor.” Hence 
the US constitutes a threat to Europe’s evolution, integration and iden-
tity.
26 This view is certainly tenable in light of recent US policy which 
has sought to accentuate Europe’s divisions. It is strengthened by the 
view prevalent in some quarters that the greatest threat to Europe’s secu-
rity is that of Americans dragging them into a foreign war.”
27 Europeans 
increasingly want Europe to take a more independent approach to security 
and diplomatic affairs.
28 This, of course, begs the question whether they 
are willing to pay for it. Moreover with enlargement and the new Consti-
tution, it appears that Europe will become more introverted in coming 
years, even as it pursues a “neighbourhood” policy, possibly more fo-
cused on the Caucasus and Central Asia than the Middle East. Continua-
tion of enlargement as a security policy looks more likely than a Europe 
that competes with the US militarily. The EU focus on institutions and 
norms will still look to the US like a cover for inaction, while for the 
 
25 Philip Stevens “The Atlantic Alliance needs to face up to its Divisions,” The Fi-
nancial Times July 2, 2004, 13. 
26 Muller (2003) 92-98. 
27 Bill Drozdiak, head of the Brussels-based Transatlantic Centre, quoted in “Char-
lemagne: We told you so,” The Economist, May  15, 2004, 30. 
28 PEW poll reported in “Europeans Distrust of US Sharpens,” in The International 
Herald Tribune. March 17, 2004, 1/8. Shahram Chubin 
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Europeans the US insistence on primacy will look like a barely disguised 
hegemony, unconstrained by rules. Hence existing differences on the 
proper agency and process for the legitimation of controversial policies 
will continue.
29 An extreme outcome might be a sustained European ef-
fort to construct a multipolar world. Europe could differentiate itself (and 
sabotage) US policies e.g. with reference to arming China.
30 This would 
be unhelpful in the extreme and could poison relations further. The logic 
of a multipolar world would be the balance of power politics associated 
with Europe prior to World War I,
31 not necessarily preferable to the ex-
isting system. 
An independent Europe arrayed against the US appears improbable. First, 
there is no support for this, except possibly in France. Second, the Euro-
peans will not will the means to make it possible. Third, economic ties 
are dense and will act to constrain a major rupture. 
How then will these differences play out?  “Everything is possible, from a 
restoration of a shared purpose to slowly drifting apart ,or even abrupt 
and bitter divorce. Perhaps the most likely outcome is cooperation a la 
carte.”
32  The fact remains that there is nothing that can be called an “in-
ternational security architecture.” The EU is introverted, NATO over-
stretched, the UNSC divided and the US over-extended.
33 The failure of 
allies to help out on Iraq, a common interest, could lead to further resent-
ment. With Iran, North Korea and the Middle East peace process in pros-
pect, the war on global terror continuing, drifting apart and even divorce 
appear more likely than the restoration of a shared purpose. 
 
29 See Kagan’s discussion. 
30 See for example Reginald Dale “Transatlantic dispute over arming China,” Inter-
national Herald Tribune, July 15, 2004, 6. 
31 See Charles Kupchan et.al “Renewing the Atlantic Partnership,” Council on For-
eign Relations report, quoted in Charlemagne, The Economist, May 15, 2004, 30. 
32 Martin Wolf “The Transatlantic divide must not be allowed to widen,” Financial 
Times June 23, 2004, 13. 
33 See Philip Stevens “A fractured world remains a very dangerous place,” Financial 
Times December 19, 2003, 13; and “Still Taking on the World?” The Economist 
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